The National Academy Science
Spent Fuel Study
Access
report :
http://www.nap.edu/books/0309096472/html/
National Academies
news: Spent nuclear fuel storage
Contact: William
Skane
news@nas.edu
202-334-2138
The National Academies
WASHINGTON -- Spent
nuclear fuel stored in pools at some of the nation's 103 operating
commercial nuclear reactors may be at risk from terrorist attacks,
says a new report from a committee of the National Academies' Board
on Radioactive Waste Management. The report calls on the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (USNRC) to conduct additional analyses
to obtain a better understanding of potential risks and to ensure
that power-plant operators take prompt and effective measures to
reduce the possible consequences of such attacks. Because potential
threats may differ according to a specific plant's design, the
committee recommended that plant-by-plant vulnerability analyses be
performed.
These conclusions were based on a
detailed review of security analyses performed by the USNRC, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, the nuclear power industry, and
independent experts. The committee noted that many security
improvements have been instituted at U.S. commercial nuclear power
plants since the events of Sept. 11, 2001. On several important
questions, however, it was unable to obtain enough information from
the USNRC to assess their effectiveness. The committee therefore
recommends that an assessment of such measures should be undertaken
by an organization independent of the USNRC and the nuclear
industry.
"Within the six-month time frame
requested by Congress, our committee of technical experts completed
a very sound, evidence-based analysis," said committee chair Louis
J. Lanzerotti, distinguished research professor at the New Jersey
Institute of Technology, Newark, and consultant, Bell Labs, Lucent
Technologies, Murray Hill, N.J. "We received input both from
scientific professionals and the public. Our findings were
unanimous. While the committee identified several terrorist attack
scenarios that could have potentially severe consequences if carried
out successfully, we also identified two relatively simple measures
that could be implemented immediately at vulnerable plants to
greatly reduce the risks."
The committee found that an attack which
partially or completely drains a plant's spent fuel pool might be
capable of starting a high-temperature fire that could release large
quantities of radioactive material into the environment. The
committee recommended that two measures be taken promptly to reduce
the potential for such fires: reconfiguring the position of fuel
assemblies in the pools to more evenly distribute decay-heat loads,
and making provisions for water-spray systems to cool the fuel that
could continue to operate even after the pool or the building in
which it is housed is damaged.
The first measure could probably be
implemented at all plants with minimal cost and time, and with
little exposure of workers to radiation, the committee said. It
recommended that the costs and benefits of options for implementing
the water-spray system should be examined to decide what
requirements should be imposed. Such systems may not be needed at
plants where spent fuel pools are located below ground level or are
otherwise protected from external line-of-sight attacks.
Congress requested the study following
conflicting claims in the media about the safety and security of
spent fuel in storage at commercial nuclear power plants, including
the risks that spent fuel might be used to construct a radiological
dispersal device, or "dirty bomb." The committee concluded the
likelihood that terrorists could steal enough spent nuclear fuel
from a power plant for use in a dirty bomb is small, given existing
security measures. Nevertheless, the USNRC should review and upgrade
where necessary its security requirements for protecting those spent
fuel rods not contained in fuel assemblies from theft by
knowledgeable insiders.
The report being issued today is the
public version of a classified report delivered to Congress, USNRC,
and the Department of Homeland Security in July 2004. The National
Academies obtained the USNRC's cooperation in producing this public
report. It contains all of the findings and recommendations of the
original classified report, but some have been slightly reworded.
Classified national security information and safeguards information
have been redacted.
"We believe this report fulfills our
responsibility to inform the public and elected officials on a
critical national security issue," said Bruce Alberts, president of
the National Academy of Sciences. "It also satisfies a second,
equally important imperative: to ensure that this report contains no
information that might inadvertently aid terrorists. We appreciate
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's assistance in confirming that."
As part of the study, the committee was
asked to examine the possible advantages of dry cask storage over
pool storage at commercial power-plant sites. The report concludes
that pools are necessary to cool spent fuel immediately after its
removal from a reactor. But dry cask storage has two advantages for
storing spent fuel older than about five years: It is a passive
system that relies on air circulation for cooling, and it divides
the inventory of spent fuel into a number of individual, robust
containers, each containing only a small amount of the total
inventory. The committee found that although there are some
differences in the robustness of different dry cask designs under
various terrorist attack scenarios, the differences are not large,
and relatively simple steps could be taken to further reduce
potential vulnerabilities.
Once the USNRC completes the recommended
plant-specific vulnerability analyses, the agency may conclude that
earlier movements of spent fuel from pools into dry cask storage
would be prudent at some plants, the report says. The committee was
not specifically asked by Congress to recommend whether the transfer
of spent fuel rods from pools to a system of dry cask storage should
be accelerated, however. Cost-benefit considerations also would be
an important part of such decisions.
Finally, the committee observed during
the course of its work that current classification and security
practices appear to be impeding the sharing of valuable information
between the USNRC and nuclear industry operators, negatively
impacting constructive feedback and cooperation. The committee
recommended that the USNRC improve the sharing of pertinent
information on its security analyses of spent fuel storage with
nuclear power plants operators and system vendors. More constructive
interaction with the public and with independent analysts also could
increase confidence in USNRC and industry decisions and their
actions to reduce the vulnerability of spent fuel storage to
terrorist attacks
###
This study was sponsored by the U.S.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission and U.S. Department of Homeland
Security. The Board on Radioactive Waste Management is part of the
National Research Council, the principal operating arm of the
National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of
Engineering. They are private, nonprofit institutions that provide
science and technology advice under a congressional charter. A
committee roster follows.
Copies of Safety and Security of
Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage: Public Report are available
from the National Academies Press; tel. 202-334-3313 or
1-800-624-6242 or order on the Internet at
http://www.nap.edu.
Reporters may obtain a copy from the Office of News and Public
Information (contacts listed above).
[ This news release and report are
available at
http://national-academies.org ]
_____________________________________________________
The
New York Times
April 9, 2005
EDITORIAL
Terrorist Attacks on Reactor Pools
A report just released by the National Academy of Sciences bears two
disturbing revelations. The cooling pools for nuclear waste at some
reactor sites may be far more vulnerable to a devastating attack by
terrorists than federal regulators are willing to admit. And the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission is operating in a hermetically sealed cocoon that
makes it difficult for anyone - even the academy, armed with a
Congressional mandate - to tell whether the public is adequately
protected.
The academy was brought into the fray after a group of scientists,
analyzing reports published by the regulatory commission itself, issued
a report suggesting that a terrorist attack could crack the pools that
hold used nuclear fuel at reactor sites, thereby causing a leak of
cooling water and setting off fires that could unleash radioactive
plumes worse than those at Chernobyl. In asking for the study, Congress
directed the regulatory commission and other federal agencies to provide
the information the academy needed. That proved to be wishful thinking.
The academy got only part of what it needed and was denied the rest on
security grounds.
Even so, the academy was able to penetrate the myth put out by the
regulators and the nuclear industry that spent-fuel pools at reactor
sites pose an extremely low risk. In a report made public on Wednesday,
a panel of experts assembled by the academy concluded that several types
of credible terrorist attacks, using planes, truck bombs or a ground
assault with advanced weapons, might be able to release large quantities
of radioactive material into the environment. The likely contamination
would not be on the scale of Chernobyl, panelists say, but it could be
severe. The plants thought to be most vulnerable are those with
above-ground pools in buildings not shielded behind other structures.
To reduce the potential for radiation-releasing fires, the panel
suggested that plant operators reposition the spent-fuel assemblies in
their pools to minimize the buildup of heat and, where warranted,
install water-spray systems to cool the spent fuel should the pools be
drained. It also called for an evaluation of each plant's vulnerability
and suggested that, if the results justified it, the commission might
want to speed up the removal of spent fuel from the cooling pools into
dry casks, where the likelihood of major releases would be less.
The commission pooh-poohed the report even before it was released,
suggesting that the academy overstated the risks, that the pools
themselves are robust structures and that if water leaked out and the
fuel overheated, a couple of fire hoses could save the day. That seems
too glib, given the academy's acknowledged expertise and presumed
objectivity.
It is
disturbing that the commission, in the name of national security, denied
the academy the information needed to assess the effectiveness of
security improvements instituted since 9/11, refused to brief the panel
on what kinds of threats it was prepared to guard against and slowed the
release of this unclassified version of a classified report with endless
fights over what could be said publicly. In general, the agency gave the
academy what it needed to assess the physical vulnerability of
spent-fuel pools but little of the information needed to assess the
readiness of plant guards and technicians to hold off attackers and
mitigate any damage they might cause. The commission is apparently now
ready to supply additional information, but the lesson of this sorry
episode is clear. The next time Congress asks for a National Academy of
Sciences report, it needs to ensure that the agencies whose performance
will be evaluated cooperate more fully.
______________________________________________________________________________________________
Statement by Nuclear Security Coalition on
Release of National Academy Sciences Study
The
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) released a declassified study which
finds that pools storing highly radioactive waste at the nation’s
nuclear power plants are vulnerable to terrorist attack. Congress
commissioned the study over a year ago, but its release has been held up
since last summer by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), which
disagrees with NAS’s findings. The coalition issued the following
statement today after reviewing the declassified version of the NAS
study:
The
release of NAS’s study puts to rest any doubts about the danger we all
face: nuclear waste at our nation’s nuclear power plants is vulnerable
to attack. We applaud the Academy for its scientific integrity and its
perseverance in seeing to it that these important findings are made
public.
As with
the release of the 9/11 Commission Report, today’s release of the NAS
study demands action. It is not enough to know the danger. Congress
must pass legislation that gets waste out of overcrowded pools. NAS
also points out that current dry storage is not without its own
vulnerabilities and must be improved.
Since
August 10, 2004, the coalition has focused a petition to the NRC on the
vulnerability of nuclear waste storage pools elevated to unprotected
roof tops in 32 nuclear power stations around the country. Pilgrim is
among this group. A pre-9/11 NRC study identifies that 32 GE Boiling
Water Mark I and Mark II reactors "secondary containments generally do
not appear to have any significant structures that might reduce the
likelihood of aircraft penetration," potentially resulting in the
drain-down of the protective water shield around the nuclear waste and a
catastrophic nuclear fire. Pilgrim is one of these highly vulnerable
reactors.
The
unsuitability of Yucca Mountain and growing opposition to a proposed
dump site in Utah make it clear that nuclear waste will remain at
reactor sites for decades to come, if not in perpetuity. Congress must
go the next step and require the deployment of more secure on-site
storage systems.
The
Nuclear Security Coalition is a national group of 47 public interest
organizations advocating for improved security at nuclear power plants.
Pilgrim watch is a member.
For more information on
spent fuel storage at Pilgrim
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
STATUS OF NRC
ALLEGATION PROGRAM, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT, JUNE 2005
Pilgrim NPS is among the 10 reactor sites highlighted in
the report because the large number of allegations received from Pilgrim
workers increased significantly last year. The significant increase in
allegations, three-times the industry median average, was primarily in
security. Pilgrim is discussed on page 18 of the report.
Allegations
Received from Onsite Source – Table is on page 25-26
|
Site |
2000 |
2001 |
2002 |
2003 |
2004 |
|
Pilgrim |
2 |
3 |
2 |
5 |
14 |
Why are
the number of allegations important? It indicates a failure of Pilgrim
to establish a work environment where employees are consistently willing
to raise safety concerns. If workers fear that if they identify
problems, they will be maligned in the press, loose their jobs or,
worse, not be able to get another job in the industry, they will remain
quiet. Problems that might have been identified early on and corrected
will be left unidentified and put us at risk.
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
ARTICLE 27 -
Duxbury Annual Town Meeting, March 2005 - approved
THE TOWN OF DUXBURY OPPOSES
RE-LICENSING PILGRIM NUCLEAR POWER STATION TO OPERATE UNTIL 2032 UNLESS
THE FOLLOWING IS REQUIRED, ACCOMPLISHED, AND CERTIFIED TO BE IN PLACE BY
THE LICENSEE AND NRC
-
On-site security heightened to
protect against: an air attack on the main reactor building, spent
fuel pool and/or critical support structures by a large or small
aircraft loaded with fuel or explosives; a floating explosive or
underwater charge from entering the in-take canal; an attack by
water or land from a force comparable in size and strength to 9/11.
The adequacy of these security improvements must be approved by a
panel of experts independent of the nuclear power industry.
-
Safer storage of spent
radioactive fuel rods until all spent rods are moved off site - low
density pool storage and hardened dispersed dry cask storage, as
approved by Annual Town Meeting, 2004.
-
Reduction of allowable
radioactive emissions into our air and water so that the biological
impact is no greater than that allowed from the releases from a
chemical plant licensed today.
-
Verification of releases by
monitors – computer linked to state and local authorities – at all
points where radiation is released from Pilgrim and at appropriate
off-site locations.
-
Replace the current water cooling
system that draws in half-billion gallons of water a day and
releases it at 30 degrees above Bay temperatures disrupting the
ecosystem, with one not harmful to marine life – a closed cooling
system.
-
Updated emergency planning for
the new security environment we face today, to protect against an
attack or other fast breaking accident resulting in major
consequence and accounts for the increased population density in
Southeastern Massachusetts.
-
Pilgrim’s re-licensing process is
expanded to include (a) a formal review of the differences between
the safety regulations that Pilgrim is required to meet and the
safety regulations that would be required if a new reactor was to be
built today; and (b) a review of its aging management program.
The Clerk of Duxbury shall forward
the text of this Article to the Town of Duxbury’s State and federal
delegation, to all Select Boards within the Emergency Planning Zone of
Pilgrim NPS, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and Entergy Corp., so
that the intent of the Citizens of Duxbury is widely known.
Submitted by, Duxbury Nuclear Advisory Committee
_______________________________________________________________________________________________
