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What’s wrong with Pilgrim’s Emergency Plan and Procedures?
 

False Assumptions Underlying Current Planning

Authorities Assume Insignificant Release Radioactivity Offsite

Emergency plans assume an accident that involves an insignificant release of radioactive materials offsite likely to only require evacuating 2-miles around and perhaps a portion of the population within a “key-hole” or wedge from 2-5 miles.

Downplaying the potential consequences of a radiological disaster at a nuclear plant began after TMI when offsite emergency response plans were designed for commercial reactors.  NRC mischaracterized the accident then and continues to do so today.

TMI Facts [Source: Arnold Gundersen, expert witness TMI 1994 trial, video link at http://www.nirs.org/reactorwatch/accidents/tmipowerpoint.pdf]

 

  • TMI’s radiation monitors onsite were off-scale; radiation estimates are based math assumptions applied upon off-site dose readings. 

  • Early on in the accident, the NRC estimated that 10,000,000 Curies of radiation were released. The NRC estimate is based on a report by NRC manager, Mr. Lake Barrett.NUREG-0637, Appendix C. Barrett used time averaged plume dispersion (Chi/Q); assumed the center (highest concentration) of the plume hits the detector; and then averaged many days of releases. Time averaged plume dispersion can be wrong on the low side by a factor of 10. Center line Chi/Q can be wrong on the low side by a factor of a 1000. Averaging the data is wrong on the low side by a factor of 3.4. Barrett recorded the maximum curies released each day; the grand total of each day’s recording adds up to 36,062,000; yet NRC insists that only 10,000 curies were released. 

  • During the 1994 TMI Trial, John Daniel (industry’s expert), determined that 17,000,000 Curies were released. Industry's own expert estimated that more radiation was released than the NRC, the guardian of public safety. Another industry expert report by Dr. Sinovy V. Reytblatt, structural engineer from the University of Bridgeport, estimated that 8-10% of containment was released as result of the spike in pressure inside the containment. The containment had 10 billion curies – 10%= 1 billion curies.  

  • A thorough analysis of the TMI accident indicates that releases were 100 to 1000 times higher than the NRC estimated and that the containment failed after the hydrogen detonation.

  • NRC and FEMA continue to use NRC’s mischaracterization of what was released at TMI. For example NRC’s Senior Advisor for Emergency Preparedness Patricia Milligan’s claimed [when giving a lecture at Harvard School of Public Health,  Radiological Emergency Planning: Terrorism, Security, and Communication August 7, 2008] that when emergency plans were initially written NRC/FEMA did not know that there had been core melt. However now that NRC knows that there had been core melt and that our data still “shows” only a “small release” of radiation  occurred, emergency plans and guidelines based on a then lack of understanding of the seriousness of the accident thereby are too conservative. In other words the continued mischaracterization of TMI’s releases is used to justify reducing the area in which emergency planning is necessary and to generally water down response planning and exercise scenarios.

Perhaps Sir Walter Scott said it best, "Oh, what a tangled web we weave, when first we practice to deceive."

By minimizing the amount of radiation likely to be released and the geographic spread of that contamination, reactors seeking a license or a renewed license in now heavily populated areas will appear to have sufficient infrastructure to quickly evacuate/shelter the population in an accident. The numbers now fit on paper.

Pilgrim NPS, for example, has the potential to release more than twice the amount of Cs-137 than was released at Chernobyl. The amount of Cs-137 released during Chernobyl in 1986 was 2,403,000 curies; the amount of Cs-137 in Pilgrim’s Core during license extension will be 190,000 TBq or 190,000 X 27 Ci = 5,130,000 curies.  In addition, during license extension there will be more than 44,010,000 curies of Cs-137 in Pilgrim’s spent fuel pool during license extension - 8 times more than a core release [Source: The Massachusetts Attorney General’s Request for a Hearing and Petition for Leave to Intervene With respect to Entergy Nuclear Operations Inc.’s Application for Renewal of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Plants Operating License and Petition for Backfit Order Requiring New Design features to Protect Against Spent Fuel Pool Accidents, Docket No. 50-293, May 26, 2006 includes a Report to The Massachusetts Attorney General On The Potential Consequences Of A Spent Fuel Pool Fire At The Pilgrim Or Vermont Yankee Nuclear Plant, Jan Beyea, PhD., May 25, 2006.]

 

Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) 10-Miles – Impact Much Wider

Emergency response plans and procedures [evacuation and sheltering] do not include plans for residents outside the 10-mile EPZ. However, according to federal government studies:

A core melt at Pilgrim NPS, would result in a 20 miles peak 1st year fatal radius; a 65 miles peak 1st year injury radius; and 23,000 peak cancer deaths.[1] A spent fuel accident would be many times worse.

These estimates are conservative. - the federal study, CRAC II:

  • used census data from 1970;

  • assumed entire 10-mile EPZ would be evacuated within at most six hours after issuance order;

  • assumed aggressive medical treatment for all victims of acute radiation exposure in developing numbers for early fatalities;

  • used a now obsolete correlation between radiation dose and cancer risk that underestimated the risk by a factor of 4 relative to current models; and current models need to be recalculated again based on the National Academy’s BEIR Vll Report (June 2005) that reconfirmed that there is no safe level of radiation, risks are greater that previously thought and health risks other than cancer must be considered –such as heart disease and birth defects;

  • sampled only 100 weather sequences out of over eight thousand (an entire year’s worth), a method that underestimates the peak value over the course of a year by 30%.

 

NRC's NUREG/CR 1433. It said that for children, the following dangers might occur from the inhalation of nuclear materials after a massive core-melt atmospheric accident.

 

 

Approximate Dangers of a Core-Melt Atmospheric Accident for Children

Distance in Miles

Mean Thyroid Dose
(rem) for Exposed
Children Outdoors*

Probability of Thyroid Damage to Exposed Children Located Outdoors if not Protected by Stable Iodine (like KI)

1

26,000

100%

5

11,600

100%

10

6,400

100%

25

2,200

80%

50

760

26%

100

200

7%

150

72

2%

200

32

1%

 

Spent Fuel Pool Accident is a credible event and the consequences could extend 500 miles. The National Academy of Sciences stated in a 2004 report, a redacted version made public in 2005 that, [2]

“Finding 2A: Spent fuel storage facilities cannot be dismissed as targets for such attacks because it is not possible to predict the behavior and motivations of terrorists, and because of the attractiveness of spent fuel as a terrorist target given the well known public dread of radiation…The committee judges that attacks by knowledgeable terrorists with access to appropriate technical means are possible.” NAS, p.4

 “Terrorists view nuclear power plant facilities as desirable targets because of the large inventories of radionuclides they contain. The committee believes that knowledgeable terrorists might choose to attack spent fuel pools because: (1) at U.S. commercial nuclear power plants, these pools are less well protected structurally than reactor cores; (2) they typically contain inventories of medium – and long-lived radionuclides that are several times greater than those in individual reactor cores.” NAS, p.36

 “A loss-of-pool-coolant event resulting from damage or collapse of the pool could have severe consequences.  Severe damage of the pool wall could potentially result from several types of terrorist attacks, for instance: (1) Attacks with large civilian aircraft; (2) Attacks with high-energy weapon; Attacks with explosive charges.” NAS, p.49

“Finding 3B –… a terrorist attack that partially or completely drained a spent fuel pool could lead to a propagating zirconium cladding fire and the release of large quantities of radioactive materials to the environment. Details are provided in the committee’s classified report.” NAS, p.6 

“Such (zirconium cladding) fires would create thermal plumes that could potentially transport radioactive aerosols hundreds of miles downwind under appropriate atmospheric conditions.” NAS, p.50

 “The excess cancer estimates …to between 2,000 and 6,000 cancer deaths”[i] p.45

Implication: Pilgrim NPS's Implementing Procedures are out of sync with reality.

  • The REWNDS (area workers go for monitoring and decontamination) and Reception Centers (area where residents go for monitoring, decontamination, transportation assistance to hospitals, if required; family reunification) although outside the 10-mile limit are respectively within the 1st year peak fatal radius (REWNDS) and Reception Centers just outside.

  • Regulators may follow the 10-mile EPZ but the public will not. Academic research, Dr. Donald Zeigler, after Three Mile Island and in NY showed that people living well beyond 10-miles evacuated – the shadow evacuation. Unless their evacuation is planned for, they will effectively place a “cork in the bottle” and those in the core will not be able to evacuate in a timely fashion.

Recommendation:

1. Plans should be based taking full account of the potential consequences of a terrorist attack or accident – planning must be for both the worst and best scenarios.  

2. Currently there is (1) planning Zone, the 10-mile EPZ; it makes more sense to consider (3) planning zones.

Perhaps the inner zone would remain at the current 0-10 miles; mid zone at 10.01-20; and 20.01 – out, to be determined. As an example, potassium iodide would be pre-distributed to both inner and mid zones, out to 20 miles, as mandated by Congress - Bioterrorism Act. The mid zone would be instructed to shelter with KI followed by an evacuation – phased in after inner core evacuates.

3. Federal and State planners can not assume that equipment/supplies/personnel required in an emergency (such as radiation monitors, potassium iodide stockpiles) can be shifted from one EPZ site within the state to another. There may be multiple attacks, as occurred in 9/11.

 Key Hole Theory of Plume Dispersion – ignores variability wind in coastal communities 

Realistic modeling assumptions and meteorological data are the key to forecasting and implementing appropriate
and effective emergency response plans and assessing damage afterwards.

Plume Modeling – the key-hole: Currently, the NRC bases regulation and guidance on outdated and simplistic
assumptions for plume transport models that do not reflect conditions at many or perhaps all sites. Guidance
assumes
steady-state, straight-line plume transport models (Class A models). Radiation is falsely assumed to
move in a relatively narrow plume with a size and shape like a key-hole. However actual wind and weather conditions
are variable and complex affected by sea and lake breezes, terrain, location/clustering of buildings, and
variable precipitation – radiation will move in a more complex and variable manner.

NUREG-0654 FEMA-REP 1 Rev. 1 Supp.3- Appendix I states that,

The guidance in this document…emphasizes that the preferred initial action to protect the public from a severe
reactor accident is to evacuate immediately about 2 miles in all directions from the plant and about 5 miles downwind
from the plant, unless conditions make evacuation dangerous. Persons in the remainder of the plume exposure
pathway emergency planning zone (EPZ) should be directed to go indoors and listen to the Emergency Alert Stations
while the situation is further assessed. P.3.

Meteorological Data: Licensees are not required by the NRC to use complex models (Class B models) and
data from multiple weather stations; instead they are allowed to base inputs to their Class A models from
the Met Tower on site. The on-site Met Tower only tells what the wind direction is on site but not what
happens to the plume as it travels offsite. Computerized combination weather-radiation monitors are readily
available and must be required by the NRC to be placed in appropriate offsite locations, determined by a
meteorological site-specific analysis, around the reactor.

Implications for emergency planning

By relying on the straight –line Gaussian model to construct a “key hole” planners are likely to make the wrong call -
send citizens into a plume; tell folks to stay put when should evacuate; or tell them to evacuate when should
shelter. Class B models must be required.

Although the “key hole” is contradicted by actual weather analysis; it allows for limited resources to appear
adequate – providing false assurance and guaranteeing that we will be caught short in a disaster.

Example: The Radiological Emergency Response Plan and Implementing Procedure for Pilgrim’s EPZ says that school
busses housed in upwind EPZ communities and their emergency resources may be directed to downwind EPZ community/communities at the time of the emergency call.  Because “Downwind” and “upwind” communities
are a fiction, the so-called “upwind” communities will be left high and dry and there will be needless chaos and
suffering because adequate resources were not pre-arranged to respond from communities well outside the likely-to-be-affected areas.

Recommendation:  Planning and targeting resources on the “key hole” should be taken out of all plans and procedures.  Communities should refuse to move their resources to service another community in a nuclear disaster and not count on resources from other near-by communities to provide service to them in a nuclear disaster. Help should be contracted with communities realistically not expected to be affected by the disaster; and more important from communities whose own population will not react to the news of a nuclear disaster which would strain their services.

Plan Assumes Slow Breaking Accident – Post 9/11 not realistic

Emergency planning should be designed to account for the full spectrum of potential consequences, including the so-called “fast-breaking” release scenarios in which radioactive releases would begin within 30 minutes after an attack. Certain terrorist attack scenarios could be capable of causing such rapid releases. This is one of the major conclusions of the report conducted for the government of New York by James Lee Witt Associates.  
[4]

However, the plan and tests of the plan are designed to address a slowly-evolving emergency, in which it is assumed that evacuation could occur over a 10 hour span or more.

Example: The precautionary transfer of schoolchildren is widely claimed and in most, if not all, communities parents/guardians are not instructed how to pick up their children at school in the event of a disaster (route and parking) so not to interfere with an orderly evacuation.

Current Goal Emergency Plans -Prevent Lethal Doses not Prevent Cancer, Disease, Genetic Damage

NRC requires evacuation planning for only those within the “plume exposure” pathway – 10 mile radius. The choice of this radius was based in part on NRC’s analysis indicating that in a severe accident, dose rates high enough to cause early fatalities from acute radiation syndrome would be confined to about 10 miles. However dose rates outside this region, though on average not high enough to cause early fatalities could be high enough to cause significant risk of cancer unless effective measures were taken. NRC’s emergency planning was not designed to limit such exposures in the event of “worst core melt consequences” for which the protection goal is that “immediate life threatening doses would generally not occur outside that zone[5].”

BEIR Vll

The National Academy of Sciences (NAS) June 2005 report, The Biological Effects of Ionizing Radiation Report [6](BEIR Vll) conclusion was simple: No amount of radiation is safe and women and children are the most at risk.

Women and Children Most at Risk: The National Academy reported that overall cancer mortality risks for females are 37.5 percent higher than for men, and the risks for all solid tumors (lung, breast, and prostateare almost 50 percent higher. The differential risk for children is even greater. The same radiation in the first year of life for children produces three to four times the cancer risk as exposure between the ages of 20 and 50. Female infants have almost double the risk as male infants.
 
Impact Offspring from Parents Exposure: While the report states there is no direct evidence of harm to human offspring from exposure of parents to radiation, the committee noted that such harm has been found in animal experiments and that there is “no reason to believe that humans would be immune to this sort of harm.”  This should be of concern to nuclear worker’s families. 

Heart Disease and Stroke: The National Academy stated that No amount of radiation exposure is safe; and noted that relatively high levels of radiation exposure increase risk not only of cancer but also of heart disease and stroke.

What does this mean to you? The Federal Government’s “permissible” maximum radiation dose for members of the public exposed to reactors under normal operations is 100 millirads per year for a 70-year lifetime. According to the Academy’s report this translates to (1) in (100) members of the public getting cancer if so exposed. In addition, 1 in about 5 workers would get cancer if exposed to the legally allowable occupational doses over their 50 years in the workforce.

Currently what is the exposure level that determines emergency classification and protective action calls? How do those levels have to be readjusted after BEIR Vll?

Clearly preventing cancer, disease and genetic damage must be the goal not simply preventing death.


[1] Calculation of Reactor Accident Consequences U.S. Nuclear Power Plants (CRAC-2),
Sandia National Laboratory, 1982.
Peak” refers to the highest calculated values – it does not mean worst case scenario. This is due to uncertainties in the meteorological modeling acknowledged by Sandia. The model only considered one year’s worth of data and does not model for precipitation beyond a 30-mile radius. This is significant because the highest consequence are predicted to occur when a radioactive plume encounters rain over densely populated area. Peak Early Fatalities are deaths that result within the first year. Peak Early Injuries are radiation-induced injuries occurring in the first year that require hospitalization of other medical attention – such as sterility, thyroid nodules, vomiting and cataracts. Peak Cancer Deaths are predicted to occur over a lifetime. However, this is not the case with leukemia which is assumed to have occurred within the first 30 years following the accident.

[2] Safety and Security of Commercial Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage -Public Report, National Academy of Sciences, April 2005

[3] US NRC Description: Principles of Evacuation, source: http://www.nrc.gov/what-we-do/emerg-preparedness/evacuation-sheltering/principles-evac.html; 2004 Emergency Public Information Calendar, Pilgrim, page 17.

[4] James Lee Witt Associates, Review of Emergency Preparedness of Areas Adjacent to Indian Point and Millstone, March 2002, Executive Summary, page X.

[5] NRC, Criteria for preparation and Evaluation of radiological Emergency Response Plans and Preparedness in Support of Nuclear Plants, NUREG-0654, 1980, p.12.

[6] National Academy of Sciences, Health Risks from Exposure to Low Levels of Ionizing Radiation: BEIR VII – Phase 2 (2005) http://lab.nap.edu/nap-cgi/discover.cgi?term=Beir+VII&restric=NAP&GO.x=31&GO.y=11


_________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Hazard Assessment – equipment to monitor and track the plume - Inadequate

Equipment to monitor and track the plume

Managing an event – making the proper emergency call - requires first grappling with what has happened. Plans incorrectly assume that data regarding the status of plant conditions, radiological release and weather are reliable, accurate and timely.

The state is dependent on the licensee’s reports and accuracy of the licensee’s equipment. Radiation monitors and weather equipment is not computer linked to the state and local authorities from all points that radiation is released from Pilgrim and from appropriate off-site locations. Local communities are dependent on the state’s interpretation of Pilgrim’s accident reports of what is happening and how it may affect the population. The state sends a team to take samples and sends those samples back to state labs for analysis. However that takes time – too much time. For a complete analysis, refer to the monitoring section.

Recommendation: Upgrade Pilgrim’s monitors and computer link those monitors to the state and local authorities; install high-tech computer radiation monitors in local communities.

 

Plans/Procedures Fail to Adequately Address Notification of Public

 

 Notification Emergency Responders & Public - Inadequate

Rapid notification of emergency responders and the public is central to planning.

Emergency Responders: Emergency responders must have communication equipment that is interoperable. Example radios in Duxbury are off frequency; this means, for example, the Emergency Operations Center (EOC) can not communicate with the schools.

Public notification: At present notification systems are inadequate in that they essentially rely on one system - sirens. Sirens can not be heard in all parts of town and can not be heard inside if the windows are down - they are simply an outdoor warning system.  Sirens can and have failed. Pilgrim’s sirens have been unreliable. They failed 12 times from January 2000 to January 2004. The latest siren failure came after a brand-new siren system was installed. All systems require battery back-ups.

A combination of warning systems is recommended - redundancy. This should be funded by the licensee and/or Homeland Security, recognizing that some upgrades are multi-purpose.

Warning/communication systems should all have backup power so that they operate when off-site power is lost. This is a logical extension of NRC’s requirement that the telephone system used by licensees to inform the NRC about meltdowns have a backup power source so the NRC will get this notification even if offsite power is lost. The same logic applies to assuring communication to the public and state/local officials.

What is needed?

Outdoors: sirens in sufficient number with an audible, but simple, voice message and battery back-up.

Indoors: rapid dialing systems that have the capability to notify workers and every household and business within the EPZ in less than 15 minutes. Systems are on the market today that can do the job – for example Sigma Reverse 911 and DCC. Sigma Reverse 911’s MassCall System allows 2,000 calls to be sent out at once, 30 second message. DCC’s phone bank has 500 phones capable of making 1,000 calls a minute, based on a 30 second transaction. Either using Sigma’s MassCall or contracting with DCC to use two of their phone banks would permit contacting 30,000 households within 15 minutes, the approximate number of households in Pilgrim’s EPZ. More phone banks could be added, as required.

Roads:
 

  • Reader boards –more installed on major highways and portable reader boards provided to EPZ communities.
  • Low frequency dedicated radio capability.
  • Busses/Vans for transportation dependent – radio equipment on board so that they can be notified.

Upgrading the notification system would not only save lives in an emergency but also reduce the need for Police to try to perform this function. If sirens fail, current emergency plans call for local police to drive up and down streets to warn residents over their PA system - a waste of resources and unlikely to accomplish the task.

 Potassium Iodide (KI)

Potassium Iodide (KI) is a U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approved over-the-counter drug that should be taken immediately to protect the thyroid gland from radiation injury caused by radioactive iodine released during a nuclear accident.

About KI: KI saturates the thyroid gland with stable (non-radioactive) iodine, thus preventing or reducing the amount of radioactive iodine that will be taken up by the thyroid. Radiological emergencies release radioactive iodine in the environment. Since iodine concentrates in the thyroid gland, inhalation of air or ingestion of food contaminated with radioactive iodine can lead to injury to the thyroid, including an increased risk of thyroid cancer.

To be most effective, KI should be taken shortly before or shortly after exposure to radioactive iodine. Even if taken three to four hours after exposure, it would still reduce radioactive iodine from being absorbed by the thyroid and still have a substantial effect – more than six hours is getting too late. The protective effects of KI last approximately 24 hours.

Where to Stockpile KI - Distance from Accident Site 

Congress passed the Bioterrorism Act, 2002, and stated that KI should be made available to citizens within 20 miles of reactor sites. They charged in Section 127 the U.S. Health and Human Services with implementation. HHS has dragged their feet and Congress’ mandate to HHS remains unfulfilled and the public not protected. 

The American Thyroid Association recommends that: Potassium iodide should be made available to populations living within 200 miles of a nuclear power plant and should be “pre-distributed” to households within 50 miles of a plant. Massachusetts Medical Society advised that KI be provided to all Massachusetts residents. 

Rationale: 

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NUREG/CR 1433 showed that for children, the following dangers may occur from the inhalation of nuclear materials after a massive core-melt atmospheric accident (like Chernobyl).

Approximate Dangers of a Core-Melt Atmospheric Accident for Children

Distance in Miles

Mean Thyroid Dose
(rem) for Exposed
Children Outdoors*

Probability of Thyroid Damage to Exposed Children Located Outdoors if not Protected by Stable Iodine (like KI)

1

26,000

100%

5

11,600

100%

10

6,400

100%

25

2,200

80%

50

760

26%

100

200

7%

150

72

2%

200

32

1%

Chernobyl: NRC’s NUREG-1623 points out that radioactive iodide can travel hundreds of miles on the winds. An increase in cancer caused by Chernobyl… was detected in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. Notably, this increase, seen in areas more that 150 miles from the site, continues to this day and primarily affects children who were 0-14 years old at the time of the accident…the vast majority of the thyroid cancers were diagnosed among those living more than 31 miles from the site. The 2001 figures were 11,000 thyroid cancers at 31 miles. The increase in disease was attributed to both inhalation and ingestion of contaminated foods.

World Health Organization: (1999) World Health Organization (WHO) Guidelines for Iodine Prophylaxis following Nuclear Accidents states in its abstract regarding thyroid cancer caused by the Chernobyl disaster:  

"This increase in incidence has been documented up to 500 km from the accident site." ...And therefore...”"That stockpiling (KI or KIO3) is warranted, when feasible, over much wider areas than normally encompassed by emergency planning zones, and that the opportunity for voluntary purchase be part of national plans."

Recommendation

  • Implement the Bioterrorism Act’s, Section 127 and stockpile KI out to 20 miles.
  • Implementation is not difficult. Important elements include: public education (notice in local tax and/or utility bills and local media); stockpiling KI in schools, shelters, group homes, hospitals, nursing homes, businesses; advising individuals to get KI and keep it at home, in their glove box and recreational vehicles – boats/campers; simplest distribution is to distribute a bulk supply to each local community’s Emergency Management Agency or Health Board and let the community redistribute.

  

Evacuation Concerns - Inadequately Addressed

A normal day on Route 3.
What will it look like after the sirens go off because of a disaster at the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station?
____________________


Shadow Evacuation: We know that many in the official 10-mile evacuation zone will try to evacuate, and that they will be joined by people from further out. Three Mile Island provides the best, and perhaps only, realistic example. There, the Pennsylvania Governor issued an evacuation advisory (note, it was not an order). It was expected to have precipitated the flight of only 3,400 people (pregnant women and pre-school children within five miles of the plant); instead, a total of 144,000 people (a government figure) evacuated the surrounding region.

Recommendation:

Include communities beyond the 10-miles in planning. In this case, advocate sheltering as a first response for those communities followed by a phased evacuation/ entry on to the major egress routes after the core has evacuated. This would save lives for those likely-to-be affected, In recent research near Indian Point demonstrated that sheltering individuals in the 10.7-25 mile region would be preferable to evacuation – evacuation tends to increase population doses by placing more people in direct contact with the radioactive plume. [Source: Chernobyl on the Hudson? - The Health and Economic Impacts of a Terrorist Attack at Indian Point Power Plant," was authored by Dr. Edwin Lyman, a senior staff scientist Union of Concerned Scientists.http://riverkeeper.org/document.php/317/Chernobyl_on_th.pdf]

Service Stations

Cars running out of gas will delay evacuation for everybody. Unfortunately not everyone keeps their tanks full. Town Emergency Management Agencies that do not have 24- hour service stations should develop Letters of Agreement (LOAs)  or Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) outlining the specific procedure to open pumps in an emergency after business hours.

Transportation dependent - bussing school children and those without cars in an evacuation, inclusive of latch-key children.

What should be done to provide greater assurance that transportation will arrive?

Mobilize Transportation Resources at Alert:
Mobilization takes time - look at the steps involved in mobilizing busses/vans outlined in the Implementing Procedure Rev 17, p.3.
"Consider requesting the Governor declare a State of Emergency, if it appears that precautionary actions may be needed. Based on emergency prognosis, direct the MEMA Region ll Director, to stage/mobilize: At Alert MEMA resources, including pre-staging buses at EPZ schools, as appropriate."

Transportation Providers have an approximate 3 hour mobilization time. However, the best time estimate for this procedure is 3-5 hours. Therefore:

Transportation providers must be required to mobilize at the Alert Stage of an accident – defined as sent out, to arrive on location, ready to load evacuees. Information from NRC documents explains that large amounts of radiation can be released within as little as 30 minutes from the start of some types of accidents/ attacks. If plans wait until a later stage of an accident to mobilize busses, they may arrive too late. If the accident de-escalates, the busses can be called off; and at worse a real-time response drill is achieved. There is no “precautionary Transfer” of school children in anything but a very slow breaking accident.

Would mobilizing transportation resources at Alert risk too many false alarms? “No” simply look at the number of Alerts reported by the NRC that have occurred nationwide. NRC Emergency Event Dataf busses are mobilized and the accident deescalates, then the area has had a good reality-based exercise to base time estimates and fix any glitches.

Send Contracts/Transportation Matrixes Annually to Town:
In order for the EPZ towns to have "reasonable assurance" all towns should see, annually, the contracts between the state and bus/van providers, the transportation work sheets and the matrixes. Only in this way can each town be certain that the following is in order: number busses available during off business hours and business hours and their capacity; number of busses with conflicting obligations, that is they provide bussing for a local district and emergency services, and the number that would honor their contract with the local district first before their commitment to evacuate those within the zone; number drivers agree to participate, trained and have pagers so that they can be contacted off-hours in a timely fashion; communication capability on busses; where busses are dispatched from and their estimated mobilization time to arrive at EPZ site.

Assure Back-up Drivers – National Guard:
Drivers who had agreed to participate may not show up in a real emergency; therefore it is important to  assign National Guard troops in advance to act as back-up. The Guard has to follow orders.

Busses Housed in a likely-to-be-impacted Community for Exclusive Use of that Community in a Radiological Disaster:
Busses housed inside one EPZ community should be for the exclusive use of that community and not slated to potentially serve another community in the event of an accident.

Real-time Test time to mobilize Transportation:
Past table-top tests have not been designed to accurately measure response time under a variety of conditions. Require
unannounced real-time transportation test for transportation providers for the dependent population - public, private and nursery schools and child-care programs, nursing homes, group homes, latch-key children and others without transportation.

Evacuation route signs
Standardized permanent road signage indicating evacuation routes should be in each community. It is important for visitors; given cuts in staffing at Police and DPW, it would free those town emergency workers for other tasks; and it would remind citizens to think ahead about emergency planning.

Reception Centers
Location: The key to any site used to for monitor and decontaminate citizens is that it is sufficiently distant from the reactor and at an angle perpendicular to the wind direction.

Capacity: Plans assume that only one in five (20%) will go to the Reception Center and Reception Centers are only equipped with personnel and materials to handle 20%– despite NUREG 0654 (J-12) that states that Reception Centers should be capable of monitoring 100% of the population within 12 hours.

This policy leaves 80% without an opportunity to be monitored and decontaminated risking their health. The policy is based on the Krimm’s Memorandum – a FEMA official who came up with the 20% based on the response of resident’s to a hurricane warning.

You can’t base policy on hurricanes. People react very differently to a nuclear disaster than to a hurricane warning. Public warning for a hurricane is ample –TV & Radio Storm Watch reports give ample warning, often days in advance; in contrast, the time of official notice of a nuclear attack/accident can be very short –less than 30 minutes.

Consequence: if 80% are not monitored and decontaminated they will not only put at unnecessary risk their physical and psychological health; they will contaminate populations in other areas with dirty vehicles. Also, it is likely many more than 20% will go to the Reception Center and it will be overwhelmed so none will be served.

Institutionalized populations may not go to the Reception Centers at all. School children, the most vulnerable population, may simply be sent to the “Host School,” facilities that do not have monitors or decontamination capability. Residents at Nursing Homes, Group Homes and detainees in jail are not brought to the Reception Centers. They will be brought to other locations – locations without monitors and decontamination equipment.

Recommendation: Large Reception Centers, appropriately located, should be developed. They can be multi-functional so that they could be used in a number of different emergencies. Colleges, large business complexes or indoor football/sports stadiums are an example of places to look at in some localities. Gillette Stadium in Foxborough would work for parts of Pilgrim's EPZ.

Unique Geographic Locations  
Some areas are likely-to-be exposed but due to geography the population can not evacuate in a timely manner. Citizens  trapped.
Cape Cod is an example. Planning and Procedures must be adapted to fit their needs – notification; sheltering with KI; and an eventual orderly evacuation when the plume has passed and roadways are open to moving traffic.

Reverse Lanes  
We learned from Katrina that it is important to reverse lanes on major evacuation routes to increase flow. Planning ahead  is important. For example: are signage and cones available to divide the inbound lane to allow for a lane to be reserved for emergency vehicles? Can dividers and signs be put in place quickly? Is the task pre-assigned to a specific department?

Phased Entry to Major Evacuation Routes
Assign National Guard or State Police to entrances to major evacuation routes to enforce a phased entry so that those closest to the reactor can first evacuate. Public notification over the Emergency Alert System of access to these routes to those outside the zone must be integrated into planning and prior public education of the highway plan to citizens in the broader geographic area.


Sheltering Concerns

Town Shelters

Recommendations

  • Dose Reduction Capability: The EPZ town shelters must be analyzed for dose reduction capability – inclusive of their interior spaces. We cannot build nuclear fall out shelters; however, we can analyze the spaces according to basic sheltering principles and then determine capacity.
  • Basic Sheltering Principles: the safest location is furthest away from the roof and windows and doors that will open to allow entry to the building – entry door should be located, if possible, on side of building facing away from reactor. Hence appropriate interior spaces are in the basement or lowest level possible and in rooms without windows – if the public must be in rooms with windows they should be instructed to sit on floor below window level.
  • Schools as shelters when school is in session: Schools should be locked-down if the emergency call is to shelter so that doors cannot be opened and let radiation inside and harm those inside. Parents and the community at large must be educated and signs prepared to place at entrances to building at lock-down

Sheltering instructions for the public
Public Education: Place instructions in the Emergency Calendar; but recognizing that many do not read them periodically place “sheltering instructions” in local papers.

Filtration Masks
After Call to shelter terminates, the public and all institutionalized populations are advised to cover mouths and exposed skin when leaving shelter (not simply during the call to shelter) to reduce contamination from radiation deposited on the ground. This is not practical advice for school children and the rest of the public for that matter. Also masks may be useful inside the shelters, because our shelters can not be 100% effective in eliminating dose.

Recommendation: Masks should be stockpiled in schools; group homes, shelters etc and the public recommended stockpiling them, along with KI, for home use.

How to determine what type of mask: one key issue is the radioactive particle size we might expect to see following a nuclear accident. No one really knows. In part this is because the particle size is very dependent on the circumstances of the release (isotopes released, temperature of the fire, weather, etc.).  But it also appears that there is simply a lack of data on this question.Most analyses of the particle sizes following a nuclear accident appear to assume an aerosol with particle sizes of either 1 or 10 microns.  However, it also appears to be possible for aerosols with a particle size well below 1 micron to be produced, particularly if very hot fires are involved.  Dr. Ed Lyman, Union of Concerned Scientists, thought cesium and some other isotopes could easily form aerosols of with sub-micron diameter.

In practical terms, for cost reasons, it would appear that the only realistic choice is the disposable N/P/or R 3M type particulate respirators. The 100 after the letter means that, if used properly, the mask is nearly 100% effective against 0.3 micron particles.  A 95 after the letter means it is 95% effective against such particles. 

3-M Type Masks: The basic N95 mask can be quite inexpensive. 3-M type masks are cheap, about 7 cents each. They come in child and adult sizes. Those with N-95 or better efficiency to screen out > 0.1 microns should be purchased. 

Example: Kimberly-Clark makes 'child sized' masks [47027]: Suitable for ages 3 - 10; Technical data:  particle filtration efficiency >97% at 0.1 microns. Kimberly Clark Adult Face Masks [47080]: NIOSA approved and designed to provide an effective facial fit for N95 respiratory protection. Technical data:  particle filtration efficiency 99% at 0.1 microns. Given all the uncertainties regarding the nature of the plume and how effective the masks would be, there may be no justification to purchase the more expensive N100 masks.  

Evacuation versus Sheltering 

Dr. Edward Lyman in analyzing Indian Point stated that evacuation and sheltering are equally effective in eliminating risk of early fatalities among residents of the 10-25 mile radius. On the other hand one sees that evacuation also tends to increase the number of latent cancer fatalities relative to normal activity, while sheltering reduces the number. It appears that sheltering in the 10.7 to 25 mile region would be preferable to evacuation. Evacuation tends to increase population doses by placing more people in direct contact with the radioactive plume. Other models (Lyman used MACCS2) and other shielding parameter choices may lead to different conclusions. Lyman urges emergency planning officials to evaluate degrees of shielding that structures in region may provide to determine the types of actions would provide greatest protection of residents of regions outside the 10-mile EPZ (page 49, Lyman)

Protecting Worker Safety

Protective Gear needed: Emergency workers should have sophisticated protective gear. The licensee and state have opposed – an economic, not a health based decision.

Currently protective gear is not provided even in a general emergency described in the Emergency Calendar as “…the most serious type of emergency. It could involve serious damage at the plant and a release of radioactive materials.” However Police and DPW workers are outside on duty at this time. Worse protective gear is not provided for those who volunteer for lifesaving missions that is to go outside after their dosimeter has exceeded the recommended “safe” level.

Clearly workers need to be provided with uniforms/clothes to cover all exposed skin; and some sort of breathing apparatus to prevent inhalation of radioactive materials. The protective gear should be in the local community, ready for use.

Until the community is properly equipped, workers should be advised to cover all exposed skin, no shorts or short-sleeved shirts.

Stockpile: Tyvek suits, boots and gloves; 3-M type masks (N-95); KI; and advise that cars/trucks do not provide adequate radiation shielding. Multi-purpose breathing masks -biological, chemical and radiological - should be made available to emergency workers who have received training for their use. Eventually workers should get a gas mask with attached canister.

Searching the web in spring 2005 the Direct Safety for example lists clothing costs (without mask) to be in the range of about $12.50- $23.00 per person per set of clothing. The total cost is dominated by the gas mask, $140.50 each. [Tychem QC coveralls: $9.28-10.42 (depending on size); Tychem SL coveralls: $17.20-19.99; Nitrile Gloves: $0.16 (4 mil thick), $0.31 (6 mil), $0.46 (8 mil); Latex over-boots: $3.00 pair; Gas mask (54400) plus canister:  $140.5  (in quantities of ten or more)]

REWMDS: The center to decontaminate emergency workers (REWMDS) must be outside the peak fatal zones – preferably 20-25 miles away. At Pilgrim NPS, the REWNDS is within the “peak injury zone” and close to the “peak fatal zone.” It is located in Carver, directly across the street from the 10-mile demarcation line. It should be moved. There should be more than one center – so that there is an alternative site if the wind is blowing towards one of the centers.

Exposure Forms: Current state policy provides workers with a copy of their exposure forms at the worker radiological center (REWMDS) -Dosimeter readout and EWE forms; Monitoring Report at REWMDS. This procedure must be clearly written into the procedures and be part of worker training so that all workers understand the policy. Workers receive a copy of their TLD readouts from MDPH after it is sent to a lab for analysis. Workers should be sure to know this, too and keep all forms for future health purposes.

Injured and Contaminated – Medical Facilities

NUREG 50.47 (b) (12) requires that arrangements are made to treat the contaminated and injured. However, the plan does not acknowledge that some accident scenarios will result in large numbers of injured and contaminated individuals.

Hospitals listed to serve those within the 10-mile EPZ of Pilgrim, for example, cannot handle monitoring and decontaminating large numbers of people. Also, some hospitals listed to serve the EPZ are too close to the reactor site to be of use.

Mobile Medical Tents: The Commonwealth of Massachusetts has stated that they intend to set up mobile decontamination tents. Do they have an adequate supply of monitors, decontamination equipment, KI and trained personnel? Because of the possibility that there may be multiple attacks, as occurred in 9/11, States can not rely on moving needed equipment from other reactor sites.

Hard Data Provided: Local communities should be provided annually with LOA’s and MOU’s to verify providers have agreed to participate; are equipped, inclusive of monitoring/decontamination equipment; the number of patients that they can handle per hour; annual training provided and completed; emergency testing completed, date and results.

Example: Pilgrim NPS – only 11 facilities are under agreement. What is the maximum number of contaminated/injured that each hospital can handle within 12 hours?                                       

Medical Facility 2003-2004           Location

Brockton Hospital                        Brockton
Cape Cod Hospital                       Hyannis
Charlton Memorial Hospital            Fall River
Good Samaritan Hospital               Brockton
Falmouth Hospital                        Falmouth
Metro West Medical Center           Framingham
Morton Hospital                          Taunton
Quincy Hospital                           Quincy
St Luke’s Hospital                        New Bedford
Sturdy Medical Center                  Attleboro
Tobey Hospital                                   Wareham   

   

Population Statistics - Pilgrim NPS's Emergency Planning Zone

Source: The Boston Metropolitan Area Planning Council Report on Population and Employment Projections 2010 -2030 http://www.mapc.org/2006_projections.html

Population Total by Municipality, January 31, 2006 (MAPC Report)
Pilgrim NPS Emergency Planning Zone (EPZ) 

Municipality

2000

2010

2020

2030

% increase by 2030

Plymouth

51,701

56,132

59,724

62,657

21.2%

Carver

11,163

12,298

13,221

13,979

25.2%

Duxbury

14,248

15,284

16,121

16,798

17.9%

Kingston

11,780

12,561

13,191

13,698

16.3%

Marshfield

24,324

25,805

26,995

27,948

14.9%

Population Total by Municipality, January 31, 2006 (MAPC Report)
Municipalities Located Along Routes to Pilgrim’s EPZ Reception Centers
 

Municipality

2000

2010

2020

2030

% increase by 2030

Middleboro

19,941

21,243

22,128

22,832

 

Taunton

55,975

58,695

60,708

62,284

 

Plymton

2,637

2,839

3,002

3,135

 

Halifax

7,501

8,059

8511

8,878

 

Bridgewater

25,184

27,334

28,827

30,037

 

Pembroke

16,927

18,575

19,334

19,939

17.8%

Hanover

13,164

13,791

14,290

14,682

11.5%

Rockland

17,670

18,811

20,827

21,213

 

Abington

14,605

15,744

15,704

16,082

 

Whitman

13,882

14,342

14,703

14,976

 

Norwell

9,766

10,223

10,587

10,873

11.3%

Hanover

13,164

13,791

14,290

14,682

 

Hingham

19,882

24,692

25,228

25,636

28.9%

Weymouth

53,987

57,017

62,735

63,610

17.8%

Braintree

33,829

34,889

34,948

35,296

4.3%

Example: The route for Duxbury and Marshfield to their Braintree High School Reception Center requires passing through the towns of Pembroke, Hanover, Norwell, Hingham, Weymouth and Braintree. The populations in the towns that feed on to Route 3 can be expected to evacuate also – the shadow evacuation. Route 3 was completed in 1963. It was designed to carry 76,000 cars daily but now handles about 140,000 on the stretch approaching the Braintree split – en route to Braintree High School. A widening project would add a third lane from Weymouth to Duxbury, if ever begun and completed 2012-2032; however with population projections from 2010 forward – the area really will not be better off. (Patriot Ledger  March 7, 2005).

Plymouth – Pine Hills  

The largest housing development in New England, build- out includes 2,877 homes on 3,060 acres. The distance from PNPS to Pine Hills is < 3 1/2 miles from PNPS. 

The current Pine Hills household size is 1.95 people per building. Based on these numbers, the build-out population will be 5,850.  As of 01/01/06, 967 homes have been built, over 5 years. Therefore, the Town of Plymouth (Lee Hartman, Town of Plymouth) expects the Pine Hills to be substantially completed within the next 10 to 15 years with a total population of 5,850, not including transients. 

There will be a sizeable town within a town, adjacent to Pilgrim NPS with obvious implications for emergency planning

 Demographic Characteristics of the Population

The region is expected to add 465,000 people by 2030. The region will be aging with a dramatic spike in the over 55 population. The largest population increases are expected in urban center such as Boston and Cambridge and in a half-dozen suburban towns, such as Plymouth and Weymouth with very large housing developments on the horizon. Source MAPC Future projections brief #1)

According to the report the area south of Boston is expected to grow faster in population and jobs than any other section of Greater Boston through the year 2030.

Jobs are important because they factor into projecting the transient population. 

Communities south of Boston will grow 13%. Plymouth is expected to add the most, about 10,000 residents – a population jump over 20%. 

The population is expanding because there is more open land and large projects are planned in Plymouth and on the Weymouth Navel Air Station land ---located just off Route 3, the evacuation route for Duxbury and Marshfield.  

By 2030,  1 in 3 people will be over the age of 55, compared to 1 in 5 now. That has an impact on health (increased susceptibility to harm from radiation exposure, routine and above routine) and transportation (increasing the number of transportation dependent). 

According to the MAPC report, all projections are based on current trends and are projected to continue to 2030, the time frame under consideration if re-licensing PNPS is approved.  

Population in Entergy's Re-Licensing Application, Attachment E 
Severe Accident Mitigation Alternatives Analysis 
E.1.5.2.1
 Projected Total Population by Spatial Element – Appendix E: E.1-61
 

The total population within a 50-mile radius of PNPS was estimated by Entergy for the year 2032 by combining total resident population projections with transient population data from Massachusetts and Rhode Island. Table E. 1-13 shows the estimated population distribution. 

Table E. 1-13

Estimated Population Distribution within a 50-mile radius 

Sector

0-10 Miles

10-20 Miles

20-30 Miles

30-40 Miles

40-50 Mile

 

50-Mile

Total

N

0

0

0

0

80474

80474

NNE

3

0

0

0

0

3

NE

3

0

0

0

0

3

ENE

3

0

33121

0

0

33124

E

5

0

33121

23185

0

56311

ESE

23

0

49682

92740

0

142445

SE

950

9936

115925

23185

0

149996

SSE

13289

69555

82803

0

0

165647

S

23695

99364

132485

84383

43397

383324

SSW

23695

49762

23696

23185

21699

142037

SW

23695

71088

277374

349491

114546

836194

WSW

23695

71088

277374

349491

183037

904685

W

22818

71088

277374

388324

286370

1045974

WNW

16494

71088

118481

303450

390150

899663

NW

11269

71088

195075

1529212

405561

2212205

NNW

5599

35544

43350

31295

321894

437682

Total

165236

619601

1659861

3197941

1847128

7489767

 _________________________________________________________________________________________________________________

[1] Calculation of Reactor Accident Consequences, U.S. Nuclear Power Plants (CRAC-2), Sandia National Laboratory, 1982. “Peak” refers to the highest calculated values – it does not mean worst case scenario. This is due to uncertainties in the meteorological modeling acknowledged by Sandia. The model only considered one year’s worth of data and does not model for precipitation beyond a 30-mile radius. This is significant because the highest consequences are predicted to occur when a radioactive plume encounters rain over densely populated area. Peak Early Fatalities are deaths that result within the first year. Peak Early Injuries are radiation-induced injuries occurring in the first year that require hospitalization of other medical attention – such as sterility, thyroid nodules, vomiting and cataracts. Peak Cancer Deaths are predicted to occur over a lifetime. However, this is not the case with leukemia which is assumed to have occurred within the first 30 years following the accident.       

 

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