Radioactive Waste


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High Level Radioactive Waste - Spent Fuel Rods

Radioactive fuel rods are placed in the reactor core to produce the heat needed to generate 
electricity. After one or two years the fuel rods are no longer useful for producing 
electricity; however they remain intensely radioactive and thermally hot. To protect the 
public from intense radiation and to cool the rods down, the spent fuel rods are placed in a 
pool of cool water.

Pilgrim’s spent fuel pool

The pool in Pilgrim nuclear plant's primary reactor building
Holds over 2,200 spent" fuel rods totaling more than a
million pounds of radioactive material.
Greg Derr/The Patriot Ledger 

Pilgrim’s spent fuel pool contains far more radioactive fuel than the reactor’s core. The 
core holds 580 rods, about 1/3 are removed at each refueling outage to the spent fuel pool – 
outages occur every 24 months. 

Contents: Spent fuel pools were designed to be temporary and to store only a small fraction 
of what they currently hold. The original plan was to reprocess the used fuel rods, 
extracting material suitable for nuclear bombs and adding new materials to make useable fuel 
rods for reactors. However reprocessing spent fuel ended under President Carter. Our nation 
decided that there was enough weapons grade nuclear material in the world. At that point the 
federal government promised to build a permanent national repository. In the interim, 
reactors could store on site. A federal repository has not been built; therefore more and 
more waste is piling up on site. 

Pilgrim’s pool was designed to hold 880 assemblies. Spring 2004, it held 2,600 rods in the 
same place by packing the assemblies closer together. The NRC has approved storage at Pilgrim 
for 3,859 assemblies in order to allow them to complete their current license (2012). 

The pool is a 45 foot deep concrete “swimming pool” that stores highly radioactive fuel 
assemblies after their removal from the core. These fuel assemblies are thermally very hot 
when they are first removed from the core. Most important, they are extremely “hot” 
radioactively – so hot that Federal regulations require an eventual repository be able to 
isolate fuel from the environment for 10,000 years. Spent fuel pools contain some of the 
largest concentrations of radioactivity on the planet.

The pool must be filled with water because the fuel releases heat and radiation. The water 
must be continuously cooled to remove the heat generated by the assemblies. If the cooling is 
halted, the fuel pool would heat up and boil away. If the water boils off or is drained, the 
spent fuel will overheat, melt, or catch on fire. NRC concedes a fire would be so intense and 
so much radiation released in the area that it could not be extinguished. Federal studies 
also show that thousands of people could die from the radiation released in a spent fuel pool 
accident.

Risk: Spent Fuel Security/ Accident

The spent fuel pool is designed to remain intact following an earthquake but it is not 
designed to withstand aircraft impacts and explosive forces. 

Several events could cause a loss of pool water including leakage, evaporation, siphoning, 
pumping, aircraft impact, accidental or deliberate drop of a fuel transport cask, reactor 
failure, or an explosion from inside or outside. 

Water loss is likely to result in a catastrophic fire. The spent fuel would be exposed to air 
and steam, the zirconium cladding that surrounds the rods would melt and catch fire. The NRC 
conceded that such a fire could not be extinguished – the radiation doses in the pool would 
be lethal – the fire could rage for days. Also the risk of a fire persists. NRC stated in an 
October 2000 study that the possibility of a zirconium fire cannot be dismissed even many 
years after a final reactor shutdown.

A spent fuel pool fire and release would be a regional and national disaster. The spent fuel 
pool contains many times more radioactivity than the core. Especially problematic is the 
large amount of Cesium-137; currently there is about 30 million curies in Pilgrim’s pool. 
Cesium-137 has a half-life of 30 years and gives off a highly penetrating form of radiation. 
It is absorbed in the food chain as if it were potassium. According to the NRC as much as 
100% of the Cesium-137 would be released into the environment in a pool fire. For comparison, 
Chernobyl released 40% of the reactor core’s 6 million curies of Cesium-137. Pilgrim’s spent 
fuel pool has more Cesium-137 than was deposited by all the atmospheric nuclear weapons tests 
in North America combined. 

Densely packed pools like Pilgrim’s are especially prone to fire. To avoid criticality of 
rods placed close together, neutron absorbing panels are placed between the assemblies. The 
extra panels will restrict air and water circulation if there is a water loss. Further, if 
the equipment collapses, as might occur in a terrorist attack, air and water flow to the 
stacked assemblies would be obstructed causing a fire, according to a NRC report.

Coalition Demands Solution for Nuclear Spent Fuel Pool Vulnerability to Terrorist Attacks - reactors designed like Pilgrim NPS (GE Mark I &II, BWRs) spotlighted as especially dangerous.

On August 10, 2004, a coalition of national, regional, and local environmental, public interest, and nuclear watchdog organizations petitioned the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to hold emergency enforcement hearings on a significant structural vulnerability to terrorism existing at 32 U.S. commercial nuclear power reactors located in 15 states.

The petition spotlights the General Electric Mark I and Mark II boiling water reactor (BWR) designs (32 reactors, nationwide) where large inventories of highly radioactive waste – used reactor fuel rods – are currently stored in densely packed elevated storage pools, above and outside the primary containment structure. 

Their nuclear waste storage pools are located near the roof and are vulnerable to a variety of attacks from above, below, and on three sides. Massachusetts citizens live in the shadow of two of these highly vulnerable reactors – Pilgrim in Southeastern Massachusetts and Vermont Yankee, just over our northwestern border.

 

To read the petition, visit
http://www.citizen.org/documents/BWRpetition.pdf

To read the annex to the petition, visit
http://www.citizen.org/documents/BWRpetitionannex.pdf. Note: view diagram spent fuel pool page 33

To read Supplemental filing of April 19, 2005 to NRC regarding the August 10, 2004 petition on the vulnerability of GE boiling water reactors as confirmed by findings in the National Academy of Sciences April 2005 public version of its classified report to Congress “The Safety and Security of Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage,” visit
http://www.nirs.org/reactorwatch/security/nscnas2206sup08102004.pdf

Safer Storage Solutions



The risk to the public can be greatly reduced by requiring low-density pool storage for 
recently unloaded fuel and secured dry casks for the rest.

Advantages

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Avoids tight packing of thousands of assemblies in the pool, where loss of coolant 
water/exposure to air would cause them to ignite within a few hours due to the reaction 
between water, air and immense heat. A fire could not be put out – the area would be too 
radioactive. 

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Because the spent fuel pool is located inside the main reactor building, a spent fuel 
pool accident is likely to result in a core accident, too.

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Dry storage minimizes the chance of an accident with thousands of assemblies: There 
are generally only 2 dozen assemblies in each dry cask, compared to Pilgrim’s pool that has 
2,278 today and will have 3,859 by 2012. An accident would result in the release of 10 times 
more high-level radioactivity than released in Chernobyl – contaminating an area (3) times 
Massachusetts.

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No risk for dry casks in case of power outage. Waste assemblies cooled by passive 
air convection. 

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Since there are no moving parts such as fans, pumps or blowers, dry storage has no 
risk of mechanical breakdowns – they are cheaper to maintain. 

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Dry storage is in use extensively in the US – at decommissioned plants and at over a 
dozen operating plants. No others are building new pools. 

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The NRC admits dry storage has fewer failure modes. The NRC has approved a range of 
dry storage designs.

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Casks can be multi-purpose, suitable for both storage and shipment. Spent fuel rods 
will have to be put into casks eventually for transport to a permanent repository. Pilgrim 
should be required to place the rods in casks now rather than wait until later, when it could 
be too late. 

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Low-density pool storage was once a common practice at nuclear plants and poses a 
lower level of hazard than high-density pool storage.
 

Dry Casks Need to Be Secured or Hardened - two proposals


Dry Casks

Typically when industry moves to dry cask storage, they place the casks on a concrete pad – 
like bowling pins waiting for a strike. However, it is not September 10th; therefore it is 
necessary to place them in a less vulnerable position. The schematic below by Dr. Gordon 
Thompson makes sense.

 

PROPOSAL #1
Dispersed Hardened Cask Storage Proposal



SCHEMATIC VIEW OF PROPOSED DESIGN
FOR HARDENED, DRY STORAGE

ROBUST STORAGE OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL: An Interim Report
Gordon Thompson, November 2002 (A report commissioned by Citizens Awareness Network)


Disperse casks so that they are a more difficult target. Pilgrim has plenty of room; it sits 
on 1600 acres.

 

PROPOSAL #2
Holtec Underground Storage Proposal

Holtec International, a major cask design and manufacturing company, will ask the NRC to approve an underground design for a dry storage cask facility (NuclearFuel, Vol. 29, Number 9, April 26, 2004).

According to Holtec’s President/CEO the design is a low-profile system – all but two feet of which would be below ground – offers “the next level of protection against terrorist attacks.”

The new system uses the same inner canister and ancillary equipment NRC has already approved as part of their Hi-Storm 100 cask system. The new system known as Hi-Storm 100U, uses a large concrete block with metal-lined cavities to hold spent fuel storage canisters. Once the canisters are in place, a lid is secured to each cavity. Canisters are passively cooled and can hold the same heat load as the existing system.

Holtec says that the system can be used at any site, even on a coastal plain or site with a high water table, because the metal canisters are welded and completely sealed off from the surrounding substrate. Preservatives will be applied to protect the concrete from groundwater. A surveillance program would monitor fro groundwater.

Some industry spokespersons commented that the underground design “potentially fuels misperceptions” among the public that spent fuel already in dry storage needs to be made more secure…

Will we again see public safety enhancements go by the board due to pressure from industry to justify business as usual – perpetuating the cheapest way out?

Finances – Who will pay for Safer Dry Storage?

The electricity market has been deregulated and this works against public safety. In a deregulated market there is no longer a pool of captive customers to pay for uneconomic operating costs or expensive capital additions – like secured dry casks. Also the owners of Pilgrim are limited liability companies with little to no cash reserves. Hence there is resistance to move wastes to safer dry storage. Either they have to be forced to do so by regulators or use federal monies.

There is a precedent for using federal monies for public safety especially post 9/11. The federal government promised that a federal repository would be ready by 1998. It wasn’t. Hence it is reasonable to argue that dry casks for waste generated under the current license should be paid for by federal monies, in total or in part.
 

Currently casks cost 1 to 2 million dollars per cask. Pilgrim NPS, for example, has 
approximately 440 tons of fuel which would cost about $71 million dollars to place it all into dry cask storage.
 

Yucca Mountain
Proposed Federal Repository, Won’t Solve Waste Problem –any time soon

Yucca is not a sure thing – legal suits are pending. Yucca would not open until 2010 at the earliest. It will take 30-40 years to transfer waste from around the nation.

We do not know where Pilgrim will be on the federal shipping schedule. Plant owners can sell or trade their place. They do not have to unload the entire inventory either. Pilgrim’s operating license ends 2012. However in 2005, they are likely to start the application process to extend their license – produce more waste.
 
Furthermore, Yucca, if it is ever built, will run out of room before it can take the spent fuel from existing reactors, to say nothing about the waste from re-licensed reactors. 

As of 2002, there were 44,000 metric tons of commercial spent fuel and 12,000 metric tons of defense waste slated for Yucca. The nation’s nuclear reactors generate 2,000 metric tons each year (Nuclear Energy Institute, “Common Objections to the Yucca Mountain Project” What Science Really Says,” 2003). By 2013 the total waste generated by our nation’s nuclear reactors will have exceeded the 77,000 ton limit for Yucca designated by Congress. Therefore, Yucca will not provide storage for any waste generated after 2013. At present 20 nuclear reactors are licensed to operate beyond 2025. This means that now we do not have one repository and we will need two. Plymouth will be a long-term waste site. It must be stored more safely.

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Yucca Mountain Lawsuit; Court Overrules Government's Lax Radiation Standards for Nuclear Waste - July, 2004


July 9, 2004 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit ruled that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) illegally set its radiation release standards for groundwater for the proposed high-level radioactive waste site at Yucca Mountain, Nevada.

The EPA set 10,000 years as the period during which radiation in the groundwater cannot exceed drinking water standards at the site's boundary, but this time frame would not protect the health of future generations. As the court ruled, the Energy Policy Act requires that the EPA determine public health and safety standards for Yucca Mountain "based upon and consistent with" the National Academy of Sciences" recommendations. The Academy's recommendation is that the compliance period should extend through the time of the peak risk for radiation doses from the repository - 300,000 years or more.

Given this ruling, the Yucca Mountain Project should be finished. The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) must show that it can prevent groundwater contamination above drinking water standards at the compliance boundary for 300,000 years - a standard that the DOE's own analysis shows the Yucca Mountain site cannot meet. The EPA faces the choice of either appealing the decision or revising its standard. Proponents of Yucca may go to Congress for a rule change so they will not have to follow the National Academy of Science standards.

You can read the court decision at:

http://pacer.cadc.uscourts.gov/docs/common/opinions/200407/01-1258a.pdf   

 

Jim Day, Las Vegas Review-Journal, July 10, 2004

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

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Yucca Mountain Data Under Fire – March 2005
Science to support
Nevada nuclear waste repository fabricated

Chemical & Engineering News
ISSN 0009-2347 - Copyright © 2005

E-mails and other documents released by a House subcommittee last week show that government scientists fabricated data needed to support construction of the nuclear waste repository at Yucca Mountain, in Nevada.

At a House hearing, three representatives from Nevada grilled Department of Energy officials and told them to stop site work until an independent investigation into the depth of the duplicity is conducted. DOE officials, however, said they were doing their own investigations, and so far, they believe no evidence demonstrates that the underlying science for the project has been compromised.

The revelations, first made public by DOE in mid-March, have led to ongoing criminal investigations by the Offices of Inspector General for the Interior and Energy Departments and the FBI. At a minimum, the investigations will delay DOE's press to file a license application with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to build the repository.

Although only partial and redacted e-mails and other documents have been made public, they show that scientists admitted to one another that they were keeping separate records--one set for quality assurance inspections and another, accurate, set. They also describe compromises needed to overcome difficulties in meeting schedules on the huge project. The messages were exchanged in the late 1990s and focused on science and models for water incursion through the mountain and climate projections for future centuries--contentious issues that are critical to the project's success.

This latest problem joins others, such as a court decision last summer throwing out the repository's radiation standard, which determines how much radioactivity may be released to the environment over the millennia the waste is radioactive.

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Transportation

Shipping Pilgrim’s Spent Fuel Rods to Yucca

By 2012, Pilgrim (Boiling Water Reactor, BWR) will have 3,859 spent radioactive fuel assemblies – 2,442 in 2004. If re-licensed to operate until 2032, Pilgrim will have generated nearly 8,000 all toll.

Shipping Rail Casks
DOE prefers shipping waste mostly by train. A rail spur is needed to connect eastern Nevada to the site. It can not be built until Yucca is ready for shipments and will take six years to build. Until the spur is completed (2016, if you believe DOE that Yucca will open in 2010, or 2021, if you believe the Government Accounting Office), DOE proposes to ship "legal weight truck sized casks" piggyback on train cars out to eastern NV. There, they'd be off loaded onto semi trucks for the cross NV drive to deliver them to Yucca until the rail line gets finished. However, even this scenario is uncertain because DOE's own Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS, February 2002) for Yucca ruled against this piggy back idea, citing that it would increase worker doses to radioactivity because of all the extra handling/loading operations required.

Pilgrim does not have direct access to rail. According to DOE (FEIS, February 2002), Pilgrim proposed barge shipments to Boston – to transfer the casks to rail in the city. Communities along the coast and Boston are likely to have something to say.

DOE’s 2002 FEIS, J.1.2.2.2 Routes for Shipping Rail Casks from Sites Not Served by a Railroad Figure J-9. Routes analyzed for barge transportation from sites to nearby railheads (page 4 of 4).

Very long, heavy haul trucks (huge monsters, with a pusher truck in back, puller truck in front, and scores or even hundreds of tires with maximum speed of 5 mph or less) could also be used to get the waste from Pilgrim to the nearest rail head.

Either way, barge or truck, the question remains whether Pilgrim has the capability to lift train sized casks. The casks weigh 100 to 150 tons fully loaded with irradiated fuel.

Trains hold 68 BWR assemblies per train sized casks – (1) cask per rail car. Assuming Pilgrim can take this option, a big assumption, in order to ship the spent fuel accumulated to 2012 would require approximately 46 train casks.

Trucks: hold 9 BWR assemblies per truck sized casks – (1) cask per truck – requiring approximately 428 trucks to ship waste accumulated by 2012.

Highway Truck and Rail Routes

Figure J-45. Highway and rail routes used to analyze transportation impacts - Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont.

[http://www.ocrwm.doe.gov/documents/feis_2/vol_2/apndx_j/index2_j.htm]



Editorial Cartoon - by Jim Day

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Resources: Transportation

U.S. Department of Energy, FEIS, February 2002
http://www.ocrwm.doe.gov/documents/feis_2/vol_2/apndx_j/index2_j.htm

State of Nevada, Agency for Nuclear Projects http://state.nv.us/nucwaste/

Nuclear Information Resource Service http://www.nirs.org/roadsrails/roadsrailshome.htm

Public Citizen, Critical Mass Energy Project http://www.citizen.org/CMEP

 

Resources: High Level Waste

1. NCWarn 
http://www.ncwarn.org/Campaigns/HighLevelWaste/default.htm   
Reports and Documents accessible on NCWARN’s Website:

  • NC WARN's Nuclear Risk Reduction Plan

  • 27 Attorneys General urge Congress to protect 
    us from attacks against nuclear power plants

  • NC WARN's Nuclear Risk Reduction Plan

  • Robust Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel: A Neglected Issue of Homeland Security, prepared by Dr. 
    Gordon Thompson, Director of the Institute for Resource and Security Studies. 

REPORTS

  • 2003: Princeton/MIT Release Study on Reducing Spent Fuel Hazards; a collection of authors released 
    a report detailing the perils of high-density storage of spent nuclear fuel in the United States. The report also outlines clear, simple steps that can be taken to reduce the risk of this spent fuel.

  • 25 June 2003: "Robust Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel: A Neglected Issue of Homeland Security." Prepared by Dr. Gordon Thompson, Director of the Institute for 
    Resource and Security Studies.

  • 19 May 2003: Pre-deployed Radiological Weapon: Reducing the Targetability of Shearon Harris

  • 31 March 2003: Princeton/MIT Study on Reducing the hazards from stored spent power-reactor fuel in the United States 

  • 12 September 2002: Nuclear power plant security workers call nuclear security a joke a report 
    by Project on Government Oversight.

  • 1997: Summary of study conducted by the Brookhaven National Laboratory on the health and economic consequences of an accident from high-level nuclear waste storage 

2. Institute for Energy and Environmental Research http://www.ieer.org  

see: IEER NUCLEAR WASTE MANAGEMENT PLAN  June 4, 2002 

 

Read about "low level" waste

 

PilgrimWatch.org