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NRC Security Regulations (DBT) Inadequate 

Since 9/11, the NRC has done little to bolster security at the power plants.
 
On April 29, 2003, the NRC, after intensive consultation with the nuclear industry finally updated security rules, called Design Basis Threat (DBT). 

The rules are not available for independent scrutiny but representatives of other federal agencies, including the Department of Defense, have told Project on Government Oversight (POGO) that the NRC's new DBT remains inadequate. ⁴

 

	The licensee continues not to be responsible for providing protection against “enemies of the state,” that is the responsibility of the federal government.5  Due to lack of resources and lack of will, the federal government has not stepped up to the plate.
	The NRC requires utilities simply to delay attackers until outside help arrives from local sheriff departments, state police, or the FBI. Tabletop exercises begun by NRC in July, 2002, indicate that it would take one to two hours for outside responders to arrive with SWAT capability. NRC's performance tests have shown that successful terrorist attacks are over in between three to ten minutes.
	Project on Government Oversight (POGO) interviewed security guards at 24 reactors and guards at only one out of four were confident that their plant could defeat a terrorist attack.6 The guard’s major concerns were that they were under-manned; under-trained; under-equipped; underpaid; unsure of how to respond. Guards are currently restricted from using deadly force unless an intruder is wielding a weapon or threatening the life of an individual. If a suicidal terrorist with a backpack (possibly containing explosives) jumped the fence and headed straight for a spent fuel pool or reactor, the guard could only observe and report the event.
	POGO reported in March 2004 that the intelligence community generally advises that terrorists would attack a target with a squad-sized force. A typical squad is 12 to 14. POGO interviewed a number of people who reviewed the NRC's new DBT [Design Basis Threat, meaning the security standards], and they do not believe that it is even close to reaching the 12 to 14 level that is appropriate.
	The NRC’s mock attack tests of security are a joke. For example, licensees are forewarned well in advance exactly when the test is scheduled; mock terrorists do not arrive by boat or helicopter, or from multiple directions.

New: U.S. Government Accounting Office Report - Nuclear Regulatory Commission: Preliminary Observations on Efforts to Improve Security at Nuclear Power Plants (GAO-04-1064T,September 14, 2004) http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d041064t.pdf

Abstract

GAO was asked to review (1) NRC's efforts since September 11, 2001, to improve security at nuclear power plants, including actions NRC has taken to implement some of GAO's September 2003 recommendations to improve security oversight and (2) the extent to which NRC is in a position to assure itself and the public that the plants are protected against terrorist attacks. This testimony reflects the preliminary results of GAO's review. GAO will issue a more comprehensive report in early 2005.

Shortcomings:

(1)  NRC's review of the plans, which are not available to the general public for security reasons, has primarily been a paper review and is not detailed enough for NRC to determine if the plans would protect the facility against the threat presented in the DBT. For example, the plans GAO reviewed are largely based on a template and often do not include important site-specific information, such as where responding guards are stationed, how the responders would deploy to their defensive positions, and how long deployment would take.

(2)  NRC officials are generally not visiting the facilities to obtain site-specific information and assess the plans in terms of each facility's layout.

(3)  NRC is largely relying on force-on-force exercises it conducts to test the plans, but these exercises will not be conducted at all facilities for 3 years.

(4)   NRC's oversight of plants' security could also be improved. However, NRC does not plan to make some improvements in its inspection program that GAO previously recommended and still believes are needed. For example, NRC is not following up to verify that all violations of security requirements have been corrected or taking steps to make "lessons learned" from inspections available to other NRC regional offices and nuclear power plants.

(5)   Moreover, if NRC needs to revise its DBT further as the terrorist threat is better defined, it will need longer to make and test all the necessary enhancements. The Department of Energy, for example, is currently reviewing the DBT for its nuclear facilities.

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4.   Speech by POGO's Executive Director Danielle Brian to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission's 2004 Regulatory Information Conference. March 11, 2004; http://www.pogo.org/p/x/2004nuclearpower.html

5.   (§50.13, “Attacks and destructive acts by enemies of the United States and defense activities,” of Title 10 of the Code of Federal Regulations, September 26, 1967.)

6.   Nuclear Power Plant Security: Voices from Inside the Fences, September 12,2003  Project on Government Oversight (POGO), www.pogo.org/p/environment/eo-020901-nukepower.html; Nuclear Power Plant Guards Continue to Raise Concerns, September 30, 2002, Project on Government Oversight (POGO), www.pogo.org/p/environment/eo-020904-nukepower.html

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