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Targets – Danger and Vulnerability
Spent Fuel – the danger
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The “spent fuel” at Pilgrim contains over 30 million curies of radioactive cesium-137, and other poisonous isotopes.
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The total amount of radioactive cesium-137 released at Chernobyl was less than 2.5 million curies.
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Pilgrim’s spent fuel is stored in a “swimming pool” about 45 feet deep. The spent fuel is outside the primary concrete containment that is intended to protect the reactor. It is located high up in the building, an especially precarious position, with a thin roof overhead. The Project on Government Oversight (POGO) reports that a certain kind of explosive could be launched from outside the fence line into the side of the pool - the terrorists would not even have to enter the secured area. Some security guards told POGO that they estimated that a terrorist could penetrate the fence line and the spent fuel pool, in 20 to 60 seconds.
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Without protective water in the pool, the spent fuel would burn. If it were to burn, NRC documents show that the fire could not be extinguished and that there is a 100% likelihood that the entire “inventory” of the spent fuel pool – i.e., over 30 million curies of radioactive cesium – would be released into the atmosphere.
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The less than 2.5 million curie release at Chernobyl contaminated people, milk and land as far away as Poland.
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A 30 million curie release would contaminate an area larger than the state of Massachusetts; much of New England could be uninhabitable for many years. |
Reactor core – the danger
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A nuclear meltdown, exposing the fuel rods inside the reactor core can be accomplished by breaching the primary containment wall. A jet, smaller than that used in the Twin Towers attack, would do. The containment walls are 4 to 5 feet thick at the base and taper down to 1.5 to 2 feet thick at the top. A 1974 General Electric study shows that if a nuclear plant took the kind of hit that the Pentagon took on September 11th the containment wall almost certainly would break. The GE study estimated that if a “heavy” airliner traveling at cruising speed hit the wall where the thickness is 2 feet, the chances of breaking through the wall would be 84%. At a thickness of 1.5 feet, penetration is certain. GE’s study defined “heavy” was anything more than 6.25 tons. The airliners used Sept. 11 weighed more than 150 tons. 8
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The consequences (based on studies performed by Sandia National Laboratory under contract with the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1982) - within the first year, 3000 early fatalities, 30,000 early injuries and over a lifetime, 23,000 cancer deaths. Peak fatal radius is 20 miles and peak injury radius is 65 miles. |
Disabling necessary support systems –the danger
Alternatively, a nuclear meltdown could occur by disabling secondary support, such as cutting off electrical power to a plant/spent fuel pool and disabling the backup generators, clogging or cutting off the main water supply to the plant/spent fuel pool and gaining control to the control room.
Because Pilgrim’s spent fuel pool is located inside the main reactor building, but outside primary containment, an accident in one is likely to lead to the other.
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Nuclear Power Plant Security:
Voices from Inside the Fences, September 12, 2003 Project
on Government Oversight (POGO), p.9
8.
Mark
Golden, “POWER POINTS: Airplane Attack
Exposes Nuclear Plant Myth,” Dow Jones Newswires 14-09-01, Dow Jones Newswires; 201-938-4604
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