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THE
FACTS |
What's Wrong With
Pilgrim's Security? Modes of Attack:
AIR
- WATER -
LAND Reactors remain vulnerable to airplane attacks
- from a commercial jet to a small private plane loaded with explosives.
Many plants, including Pilgrim, are short distances from private and commercial airports where security measures may be limited. Risk: There is no security to prevent an air attack. Despite the fact that the 9/11 Commission said it its report that the al-Qaeda plot to hi the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001 had originally contemplated hijacking 10 planes and striking one or more nuclear power plants. The NRC commissioned a study in 1982 of jet crashes at nuclear reactors. It stated that a commercial airline crash into a reactor could "lead to a rather violent explosion" with a "direct release of radioactivity." If only one percent of the fuel, say 500 lb for a FB-111 fighter plane, is involved in such an incident, the blast environment will be equivalent to detonating approximately 1,000 lbs of TNT. Further, the NRC, in a press release, 9/21/01, stated that, "The NRC recognizes that aircraft crashed may result in multiple failure initiating events, and that non-safety system malfunctions could contribute to such events." The FBI, January 30, 2002,warned of attacks on nuclear reactors. They stated that they had indications that a truck bomb or airplane attack on a nuclear plant or other U.S. nuclear facility, such as a weapons storage depot, is designed to cause mass casualties and spread deadly radiological debris. National Resource Council, July 2002 report "Making the Nation Safer" states that, "Nuclear power plants may present high-visibility target for terrorist attack, and the potential for a September 11-type surprise attack in the near term using U.S. assets such as airplanes appears to be high. Such attacks could potentially have severe consequences if the attack were large enough and, were such an attack successfully carried out, could do great harm tot he nation's near-term energy security and civilian nuclear power as a long-term energy option." http://books.nap.edu/html/stct/39-64.pdf The Homeland Security Department, November 7, 2003, warned law-enforcement officers that Al Qaeda maybe plotting to hijack cargo jets in Canada, Mexico or the Caribbean and fly them into American nuclear power plants. Federal studies show that
planes can penetrate the reactor’s walls.
The pool roof and critical “softer” support structures needed, for example, to keep the radioactive fuel pool operating --- such as switch-yard and control room ---
are even less substantial.
These studies are public and have been reviewed. The industry sites their own study to the contrary – problem is that they refuse to release the study so that independent analysts can review its methodology and conclusions. Since September 11, 2001, a “no fly” zone was put into effect for a short period, and was then eliminated. Because of the proximity of Boston and other airports, a “no fly” zone can not be large enough to permit effective response by Air Force or National Guard fighter aircraft. Even at the relatively slow speed of 300 miles per hour, a ten-mile “no fly” zone would provide only 2 minutes advance warning. The time for the two interceptor jets on “high alert” at Otis to be airborne is ten minutes. To be effective a no-fly zone would have to be 100 miles – crippling US air industry.
Options: A petition was filed with the NRC to construct shields composed of I-beams with steel or other cabling and netting between them at standoff distances around the key structures at nuclear power plants. Airplanes or jets attempting to attack sensitive structures would instead crash into the surrounding Beamhenge shield, leaving intact the reactor, spent fuel pool, and support facilities, thus protecting the public from damage that would result in substantial radioactive releases. The Beamhenge concept may also provide some measure of protection against such weapons as shoulder launched rockets, causing them to detonate before reaching the intended target. I-beams are relatively inexpensive, and their installation can be done quickly and with modest expenditures. Website: Visit the
Committee to Bridge
the Gap to view a two minute video narrated by Martin
F.
Ground-based air defense systems
is therefore a better way of enforcing a keep-out zone around nuclear power plants.
The Raytheon Phalanx Close-In Weapon System is appropriate for a wide range of threats and avoids problems associated with surface to air missiles. It is a rapid fire, computer-controlled, radar-guided gun system designed to defeat air threats. The Phalanx systems uses 20 mm bullets and is currently used on U.S. Navy vessels. It offers around the clock protection and is cheaper, safer and more reliable than other means of protection. The computerized radar system can determine if an aircraft's flight path termination point is at the reactor site. If such a determination is made, operating personnel can verify the approaching threat and destroy it shortly before it strikes the reactor. The system is ideal to use when the reactor is close to an airport or busy traffic lines, like Pilgrim NPS, because of its advanced analysis capabilities. It is ideally suited to protect nuclear reactors because it is available 24 hours a day and able to differentiate between a real threat and a passing or lost aircraft. What are the drawbacks to putting missiles in or near nuclear reactor sites?
Compare risks against the benefits - choice is easy.
Pilgrim is on Cape Cod Bay with an extensive shoreline. Fishermen bring their boats inside the 500-yard security zone. During the summer months, there is considerable pleasure boat traffic crisscrossing in front of the reactor site. Current Status :There is a 500-yard “exclusion zone,” simply marked by buoys – the equivalent of “no-trespassing signs.” It is not made impenetrable, and does not appear to be patrolled most of the time. It was announced on March 25, 2003 that Coast Guard patrols were increased; however the Coast Guard’s resources are limited. Once the patrol leaves the site, a terrorist can strike. A floating boom is, or was going to be, placed across the mouth of the intake canal but this will not stop a submerged weapon.
Land August 31, 2004, a tourist from Connecticut was caught fishing on the waterfront in front of the Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station. He told the police that he did not see the “No Trespassing” signs. The real story isn't that he was caught. The real story is that a fisherman tourist from Connecticut who didn't see the "No Trespassing" signs could breach Pilgrim's security in the first place. Effective security doesn't catch people after they have rigged their rods, baited their hooks, and set their casts. Effective security would keep people out in the first place. If a fisherman tourist wearing flip-flops can breach security with such ease, and not be caught until after he has had time to set his line, imagine what harm a terrorist actually trying to evade detection could do.
The NRC should also take into consideration the inclusion of multiple coordinated teams. Attackers should be presumed to use a full range of weapons to include shaped charges, shoulder-fired rockets, mortars, anti-tank weapons, large quantities of explosives etc. The explosives, weapons and equipment need not be limited to hand-carried items as stated in current regulations. The DBT regulations should include a minimum of three insiders, in addition to the 19 external attackers, as opposed to the current one insider as stated in the current security rule. The insiders should be presumed to play both a passive role (e.g., supplying information) and an active role (e.g., directly participating in a coordinated attack or separate sabotage actions). A land vehicle should not be limited to a four-wheeled drive car or truck, as is the case now, but include the full range of trucks and other vehicles, such a boats, a group like Al Qaeda might employ in an attack. Outside Responders: What help Can They Offer? In the event of a terrorist attack, the NRC does not require a facility to be able to defeat the attack without help from the outside - SWAT units from the local sheriff, State Police or the FBI. The NRC only requires that the security guards are capable of delaying the attack long enough for outside help to arrive. Nuclear reactors can not depend on outside help to defeat a terrorist attack. The Project on Government Accountability (POGO) consulted security experts. They agreed that a suicidal attack aimed at the reactor or spent fuel pool would be over, one way or the other, in 3-10 minutes. In fact, people familiar with NRC OSRE's tell POGO the mock attacks are usually lost in three minutes. Top NRC officials acknowledged to POGO, that tabletop security exercises show that it would take one-two hours for outside responders to arrive on the scene and get organized. The delay results from the actions that must take place if Pilgrim makes an emergency call that it is under attack and needs outside help. These actions are:
Apparently licensees have never actually tested the length of time it would actually take for an outside responder SWAT team to arrive. The NRC has recently begun a pilot program to test these timelines, but only with tabletop exercises - not actual drills. Even if some local and State Police or local sheriffs' deputies could respond in 10-20 minutes, they do not constitute a combat force. They do not carry automatic weapons; are not familiar with the reactor layout or target sets to be protected; and have not had extensive coordinated on-site training.
NRC officials currently regard the two-hour delay in response time acceptable. They believe it would take at least an hour or two after an attack before irreversible core meltdown would occur. But the NRC has performed no analysis to support this assumption. NRC admits that if the terrorists or an "active insider" disables the reactor controls and their back-up, there would be nothing outsider responders could do. Wackenhut is the largest supplier of private security guards at U.S. nuclear facilities and according to their own security worker’s union, the Service Employees International Union, “Wachenhut is putting our homeland security at risk” - Visit their website at http://www.eyeonwackenhut.com/ . Posted 2004.
This recent advertisement from the Union hoping to encourage citizens to contact the NRC and demand action
reads:
2. Excessive Hours -six and seven straight days of 12-hour shifts.
Under-trained: Nuclear industry executives have repeatedly claimed that guards receive 270 hours of training before being posted; 90 hours per year to re-qualify with their weapons; and 30 hours per year in antiterrorist tactical exercises. None of these claims appear to be true. Most guards interviewed train with their weapons only once per year for two to three hours during their annual weapons qualification. Most also have had no training or practice in shooting at a moving target. "Tabletop" exercises are so rudimentary that utilities use red and blue colored clothes pins to depict locations and tactics of guards and terrorists. For example: According to two former Seabrook nuclear power plant guards who were hired post-9/11, they were only given four days of tactical training and three days of weapons training before being posted. Neither they, nor any of the other 14 recruits in their training class, had military or law enforcement experience. The majority of those recruits had never even fired a weapon before. Yet during their training they were limited to firing 96 rounds with their handguns and fewer rounds with their shotguns, and were told they "would not be firing our service weapons again until the annual qualifications." The guards said they informed the trainers more training was necessary, but were told that if they wanted more practice with the weapons, it would have to be on their own time and at their own expense. Under-equipped: Many of the guards believe they are not equipped with adequate weaponry. The power and range of weapons provided to many of the guards is vastly inferior to the weapons known to be used by terrorists, due in part to restrictive state laws. According to one guard, terrorists will come armed with automatic weapons, sniper rifles, and grenades and the guard force "would be seriously outgunned, and won't have a chance." Underpaid: Low wages and inadequate health, disability and other benefits are causing turnover in the guard force at some plants as high as 70-100% over the 3½year life of a labor contract. At six nuclear facilities identified by POGO, security guards were being paid $1 to $4 less per hour than custodians or janitors. Guards also often earn less than workers in their area who face substantially less risk such as funeral attendants, manicurists, and aerobic instructors. Unsure: Nearly all of the guards interviewed raised concerns about the lack of guidance on the use of deadly force. Guards are currently restricted from using deadly force unless an intruder is wielding a weapon or threatening the life of an individual. If a suicidal terrorist with a backpack (possibly containing explosives) jumped the fence and headed straight for a spent fuel pool or reactor, the guard could only observe and report the event. One guard summed up the problem stating: "If you pull the trigger, you're on your own and you'll need a good lawyer." In response to POGO's findings, the NRC issued two new orders requiring nuclear power plants to improve training of security officers and to limit the amount of overtime that officers are obligated to work so that they are not fatigued. It is too soon to judge if the order has been followed through and made any difference. 9. The air analysis is based on research by Dr. George Lewis Associate Director, Security Studies Program, MIT Cambridge MA 02139. 10. Nuclear Power Plant Security: Voices from Inside the
Fences, Project on Government Oversight, September 12, 2002, see full report on www.pogo.org.
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