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HOW TO BETTER DEFEND SPENT FUEL
Secured Dry Cask Storage of Spent Fuel

Problem

Because there is no federal repository for spent, but highly radioactive, nuclear fuel, rods have been stored on site in high density pools – in a space neither designed for current capacity nor to secure against a terrorist attack or act of malice. 

Massachusetts Attorney General Thomas Reilly joined his colleagues around the nation in a letter to Congress highlighting this danger.

Pilgrim: Pilgrim’s used nuclear fuel rods are in a crowded “swimming pool” high in the main reactor building, with a thin roof overhead, outside primary containment. In 2004, 2,600 rods were in the pool - in a space designed for only 880; approximately 160 rods are added every other year. The pool is vulnerable to attack from three sides. Even without a terrorist threat, accidents can happen. If pool water is lost for any reason, and numerous scenarios could cause a loss, the crowded fuel rods will ignite and will release radioactivity that will contaminate over 25,000 square miles. 

National Coalition Petitions NRC: Pilgrim and 31 other reactor's spent fuel pools - especially vulnerable to attack

August 10, 2004, a national coalition petitioned the NRC for emergency enforcement action on reactors designed like Pilgrim (BWR Mark I & II's) because of their structural vulnerability to terrorism. Pilgrim, like 31 other reactors, are constructed so that their fuel storage pools are literally on the roof of the reactor building in structures that NRC identified, pre 9/11, as vulnerable to aircraft penetration. The same study identified that the resulting nuclear waste fire involving hundreds of tons of irradiated nuclear fuel would cause tens of thousands of fatalities out to 500 miles. Click here for the Petition, Annex to the Petition and list of affected reactors http://www.nirs.org/reactorwatch/security/securityhome.htm

Yucca Mountain won't solve the waste problem

Yucca Mountain, the proposed federal repository, will not open for many years, if ever. The Federal Government’s investigative arm (GAO) now says Yucca will not open before 2015, and it will take 30-40 years to ship the nation’s current waste. Litigation is pending. Who knows when Pilgrim would ship once a site is open? They can trade or sell their spot on the shipping schedule and they do not have to send it all right away, anyway. Also waste generated in the United States by 2011, or even before, will fill Yucca Mountain's maximum legal capacity. Then, the nation will have to build a second repository somewhere east of the Mississippi. We need a safer solution over the long, intervening years.

Solution
 

Require low density pool storage of recently unloaded fuel that is too hot to place in casks and dispersed and hardened on-site dry cask storage of the rest as an interim measure to better protect the health and well being of impacted communities until all waste is moved off-site to a permanent federal repository. ¹¹

There is a safer way to store spent fuel – secured dry cask storage. “Secured” means that it is made resistant to both attack and human error. This must be achieved in three ways.

	Storage must be passively safe, so that spent fuel is safe without electrical power, cooling water or an operating crew – casks are passive whereas pools require electricity, coolant, human intervention...
	Storage must be "hardened," so that the spent fuel and containment structures are protected from damage by attack – casks are stainless steel, with a concrete over-pack – further reinforce each cask by surrounding each with earth and gravel.
	Storage must be "dispersed," so that spent fuel is not closely concentrated at one location – separate casks by 60 feet, as opposed to 6 feet, as is done pre 9-11.

Use the pool only for recently unloaded fuel that is too hot to place in casks. The pool now will have low-density racks, like its original design, and this will allow for air circulation to keep the rods cool if water is lost - allowing for remedial action. This makes the reactor a less attractive target and if there is an attack the consequences far less severe.

Take Action!

11.   Contact: Dr. Gordon Thompson Institute for Resource and Security Studies - 27 Ellsworth Avenue, Cambridge, MA  02139, USA  Phone: (617) 491-5177   Fax: (617) 491-6904 Email: irss@igc.org