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Latest News:
NRC announces new security regulations, January 29,
2007.
The new rule does not require
protection against attacks by airplanes, nor against more than a small
number of attackers on the ground - a number that would represent a fraction
of the 19 terrorists involved in 9/11. Urgent
Action - send comments to the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission By February 23, 2007 - background, procedure, and suggested
comments
outlined here.
What is wrong with
security at Pilgrim?
What is wrong with this picture?
Pilgrim is NOT Secure
Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station is not adequately protected and is vulnerable to a catastrophic
release of radiation triggered by a terrorist attack. Threats can come from both outside and inside the nuclear reactor’s property. The goal is to
release deadly radiation into the surrounding communities – radiation is the most poisonous
and long- lived toxin on earth.
In simple terms, the public is protected from the radioactivity by steel reinforced concrete
walls, zircaloy cladding surrounding fuel rods, and pools of circulating coolant water.
A terrorist or saboteur would try to breach containment, cut the water supply, or cut the
electricity to disable operating systems.
CONSEQUENCES – WHY SECURITY IS IMPORTANT
A spent fuel pool attack at Pilgrim could contaminate approximately 25,000 square miles – an
area 3 times the size of Massachusetts.
A core melt at Pilgrim is calculated by the federal government to result in a peal first year
fatal radius of 20 miles and a peak first year injury radius of 65 miles and 23,000 cancer
deaths.
Worse Than Chernobyl
- new
study analyzing health and economic consequences of a terrorist attack by the
Union of Concerned Scientists. More
NRC SECURITY REGULATIONS – INADEQUATE
For example: Pilgrim’s security is not responsible for providing protection against “enemies
of the state,” (terrorists are enemies of the state); instead that is the responsibility of
the federal government. Pilgrim’s security is simply required to delay attackers until
outside help arrives from local sheriff departments, state police, or the FBI; however, it
will take too long for them to arrive. Furthermore, neither the federal government nor local
outside help has participated in actual coordinated drills with Pilgrim’s own security.
More
Some Potential Modes of Attack on Civilian Nuclear Facilities
1
|
MODE OF ATTACK |
CHARACTERISTICS |
PRESENT DEFENSE |
| Commando-style
by land |
- Could involve heavy weapons/sophisticated tactics
- Attack requiring substantial planning and resources
|
Alarms, fences, lightly-armed guards, with
offsite backup |
|
Commando-style by water |
·
Could involve heavy weapons/sophisticated tactics
·
Could target intake canal
·
Attack may be planned to coordinate with a land attack
|
500 yard no entry zone – marked by
buoys – simply, “no trespassing” signs
Periodic Coast Guard surveillance by boat or plane |
| Land-vehicle bomb |
- Readily obtainable
- Highly destructive if detonated at
target
|
Vehicle barriers at entry points to Protected Area |
| Anti-tank missile |
-
Readily obtainable
- Highly destructive at point
of impact
|
None if missile is launched from offsite |
| Commercial aircraft |
- More difficult to obtain than
pre-9/11
- Can destroy larger, softer targets
|
None |
| Explosive-laden smaller aircraft |
- Readily attainable
- Can destroy smaller, harder targets
|
None |
| 10-kilotonne nuclear weapon |
- Difficult to obtain
- Assured destruction if detonated at target
|
None |
TARGETS – DANGER AND VULNERABILITY
Spent Fuel
 |
The “spent fuel” pools at Pilgrim contains many times the radiation released in
Chernobyl – and could contaminate an area 3 times the size of Massachusetts. |
|
|
Pilgrim’s spent fuel is stored in a “swimming pool” inside the main reactor building,
outside the concrete containment that is intended to protect the reactor. The pool is near
the top of the building, an especially precarious position. |
|
|
Without protective water in the pool, the spent fuel would burn. If it were to burn,
NRC documents show that the fire could not be extinguished - there is 100% likelihood that
the entire “inventory” of the spent fuel pool would be released into the atmosphere.
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Reactor Core
A nuclear meltdown, exposing the fuel rods inside the reactor core, can be accomplished by
breaching the primary containment wall. A jet, smaller than that used in the Twin Towers
attack, would do. Federal reports state that 1 out of 2 commercial planes flying today could
breach these buildings.
Disabling necessary support systems
Alternatively, a nuclear meltdown could occur by disabling secondary support, such as cutting
off electrical power to a plant/spent fuel pool and disabling the backup generators, clogging
or cutting off the main water supply to the plant/spent fuel pool and gaining control to the
control room. More
WHAT’S WRONG WITH PILGRIM’S SECURITY?
Air: Since September 11, 2001, a “no- fly” zone was put into effect for a short period, and
was then eliminated. Because of the proximity of Boston and other airports, a “no fly” zone
can not be large enough to permit effective response by Air Force or National Guard fighter
aircraft. Even at the relatively slow speed of 300 miles per hour, a ten-mile “no fly” zone
would provide only 2 minutes advance warning. The time for the two interceptor jets on “high
alert” at Otis to be airborne is ten minutes. Flights between secondary airports do not even
screen passengers. Hyannis, for example, is a five minute flight from Pilgrim. We need a
combination of on-site missiles and a no-fly zone for a heads-up. More
Sea: There is a 500yard “exclusion zone”, marked by buoys or floating “no-trespassing”
signs, is not impenetrable, and is not patrolled most of the time. There is no capability of
immediate armed response. There is no screen across the in-take canal to block a submerged
explosive- simply a boom. More
Land: Outside responders can offer little help. On site security personnel are under-manned,
under-trained, under-equipped, under-paid and unsure of what they can do according to the
workers, themselves. More
FEDERAL TESTS OF SECURITY – NOT CREDIBLE/INADEQUATE
On-site security tests are not credible because
Wachenhut, the foreign
–owned company that provides security for Pilgrim and half the nation’s
reactors will also test security at these reactors - a conflict of interest.
The tests, themselves, are not adequate because
there is to much advance notice; the tests set
a low bar to hurdle by using a low passing grade; the tests are performed during operating
hours when the number of workers on site are minimal; tests limit the insider role to that of
a passive participant; tests have only involved attack from one direction and one team of
attackers; tests require defense against only a small number of attackers; tests to not
assess the reactor’s ability to defend the spent fuel pool or defend against an attack using
aircraft or boats; if a licensee performs poorly there are not enforcement actions; no
independent observers or input.
NRC MODIFIES SECURITY REGULATIONS – AVAILABILITY SECURITY
INFORMATION, INCLUDING LICENSEE’S PERFORMANCE ON TESTS, RESTRICTED TO PUBLIC
(08/04) More
HOW TO BETTER DEFEND SPENT FUEL
Order the transfer of all but the recently unloaded spent fuel rods from the spent fuel pool
(that requires human intervention, electricity and other features) to a secured dry cask
system (a passive design, with no mechanical components). This technology significantly
increases the security of waste materials. More
WHY CONSIDER FEDERALIZING SECURITY
1. The decision as to how much security is required will be independent of the
licensee’s desires to save money.
2. The Federal Government can provide types of securities that the industry or
local/state government cannot.
Links
Nuclear Control Institute http://www.nci.org/
Independent research and advocacy center specializing in problems of nuclear security.
Project on Government Oversight http://www.pogo.org/
Government Watch dogs; detailed research on status security and federal oversight.
Program in Science and Global Security, Princeton University
http://www.princeton.edu/~globsec/people/fvhippel_spentfuel.html
Studies spent fuel hazards
NC Warn http://www.ncwarn.org/
A nonprofit group in North Carolina; very valuable site on security and waste storage issues
Congressman Edward Markey http://www.house.gov/markey/
Reports
"Nuclear Unsecured: America's Vulnerable
Nuclear Plants", Public Citizen, Nov/Dec 2004
http://www.citizen.org/documents/ACF1A9.pdf
GAO Report (GAO-03-752),
"Oversight of Security at Commercial Nuclear Power Plants Needs to be
Strengthened," September 2003
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03752.pdf
Are These Towers Safe?
Time Magazine, June 20, 2005 - read this
article
POGO’s presentation to the
National Academy of Sciences on the “Vulnerability of Spent Fuel Pools" -
read this
report
Take
Action!
1.
Gordon Thompson, Robust Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel: A Neglected
Issue of Homeland Security, p. E-S 5, December 2002.
NOTE: Pilgrim Watch added 2nd row to table, ATTACK BY WATER.
PilgrimWatch.org
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