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FIRE
Fix Fire Safety
Problems at U.S. Power Reactors
http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_power/nuclear_power_risk/safety/fix-fire-safety-problems-at.html
A fire at a power reactor could lead to a serious accident
and a release of deadly radiation—yet many reactors are not following fire
safety regulations. The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS) is working to
change this.
In 1975, the Browns Ferry nuclear plant in Alabama had a fire
in an area that housed thousands of electrical cables used to power critical
equipment throughout the plant. The fire disabled the emergency core cooling
systems on Unit 1. Water dropped within inches of the reactor core before ad
hoc actions by operators regained control, averting a potential reactor
meltdown and the deadly release of radioactive material.
In 1980, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) adopted
regulations to prevent another Browns Ferry-type incident. The regulations
stated that electrical cables for a safety system and its back-up system had
to be separated by a distance of 20 feet or the cables had to be wrapped in
material that could withstand a fire for at least one hour.
Today, the NRC and the nation's nuclear plant operators are
woefully ignoring these critical fire safety regulations. This despite the
fact that the industry's own risk assessment considers fire to be the
greatest risk in a nuclear plant's operations. A 1992 whistleblower's
report and a 1993 NRC test found that the most prevalently used fire
retardant cable wraps are deficient and fail within minutes of being exposed
to fire, as opposed to the required one hour. Rather than replace the
deficient fire wraps, owners are often substituting illegal manual actions
to maintain redundant systems.
In January, 2008, the NRC's Inspector General reported that
the NRC has repeatedly ignored fire safety violations over the past 15
years. The US Government Accountability Office issued a similar report in
June 2008. This past July, NRC Commissioner Gregory Jaczko testified that it
is unlikely that any of the nation's 104 operating nuclear power plants are
in compliance with the 1980 regulations.
In the 33 years since the Browns Ferry incident, the risk of
a fire at a U.S. nuclear power plant with potentially deadly consequences
remains unacceptably high.
Action
Please contact the NRC commissioners to urge the NRC to protect the public
and vigorously enforce its fire protection regulations. Dr. Dale E. Klein,
Chairman; Commissioner Gregory B. Jackzo; Commissioner Peter B. Lyons;
Commissioner Kristine L. Svinicki at U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, DC 20555-0001 [Tel (301) 415-1750; Email
SECY@nrc.gov
]
Fire Protection System at Pilgrim
Pilgrim’s fire protection system according to the NRC
Resident Inspector, back in 2004, includes separation, automatic detection
and suppression, and operator manual actions.
Pilgrim relies on “separation” for its primary means of fire defense. The 17
foot distance between the walls is supposed to be great enough to prevent
flames from leaping from one room to another. However, when a former NRC
Resident Inspector was asked a few years back how “separation” had been
determined, it became apparent that they were relying on the original blue
prints. There had not been actual inspections by the NRC so he guessed that
the distance between the walls was about “one giant step and two bunny
hops."
The NRC Resident Inspector, 2004, was asked for an update. He stated that
the licensee inspects the spaces and fire equipment in accordance with
pre-established surveillance/test plans. Additionally, the NRC itself
performs inspections, including reviews by the Resident Inspectors as part
of the baseline program. In general, the resident reviews consider fire
hazards and fire protection during routine (daily, weekly, etc) tours of
plant areas. The question remains: Can tours of the plant see what is
between the walls?
Pilgrim does not use Thermo-Lag for fire wraps that test
showed were flammable. Currently we do not know what they use for fire
wraps; and if what they use has been properly tested to demonstrate its
suitability. HEMYC is not suitable.
Fires at Pilgrim
March 7, 1997 Pilgrim reported a spill of 4,300 gallons of combustible
insulating oil over 7,000 square feet inside the reactor’s turbine building.
Fortunately it did not ignite. Because of the large oil spread, NRC
determined that a fire could have disabled both the normal and emergency
systems used to cool the reactor fuel – a potential disaster. Pilgrim’s fire
analysis did not foresee a spill – nor do they see a terrorist attack.
November 10, 2000, Pilgrim reported that a welder performing routine
maintenance work triggered a small fire. The fire was started by sparks
showering from a welder’s torch that ignited radioactive waste contaminated
rags in a room below. However, the public is told that fire safety at
Pilgrim rests mainly upon the assumption that a fire will not spread from
one room to another because the distance between the walls of each room is
such to isolate any given fire – 17 feet. The 17-foot space was supposed to
be empty. Did the welder’s sparks jump 17 feet?
Recent NRC Event Reports
NRC Event Report 44611Unusual Event - Fire in HP Calibration Lab; 2008
NRC Event Report 37513 Unusual Event Declared due to Fire onsite; 2000.
NRC Event Report 35736: Unusual Event declared Due to request for Off-Site
Fire Fighting Assistance to Extinguish Main Transformer Fire;1999.
Resources
Fire When NOT Ready
is a report on a primary threat of reactor core meltdown and the
unacceptable efforts by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to protect
Americans from this known hazard, October 2008
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nuclear_power/Fire-When-Not-Ready.pdf
More
Structural Issues
PilgrimWatch.org
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