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FIRE
Risks and Consequences from Fire
According to the NRC (NUREG-1150), over the course of a reactor’s license they will experience 3-4 significant fires. The same study points out that a fire can cause 50% of the overall risk of an accident that leads to fuel core damage.
The NRC introduced a proposed rule
change on November 26, 2003. It said that, instead of putting in physical
fire barriers, nuclear plants could rely on personnel to
run through the plants and try to
turn off the reactors by hand while parts of the facilities are engulfed in
flames. The rule change may
go into effect as early as next spring. What is the reason for the proposed
change? Many nuclear power plants have not been abiding by current
regulations to put up proven fire barriers and to do so would cost the
industry money. For more visit:
http://www.progressive.org/august04/cusac0804.html;
http://www.ens-newswire.com/ens/aug2004/2004-08-03-02.asp
Fires at Pilgrim
March 7, 1997 Pilgrim reported a spill of 4,300 gallons of combustible insulating oil over 7,000 square feet inside the reactor’s turbine building. Fortunately it did not ignite. Because of the large oil spread, NRC determined that a fire could have disabled both the normal and emergency systems used to cool the reactor fuel – a potential disaster. Pilgrim’s fire analysis did not foresee a spill – nor do they see a terrorist attack.
November 10, 2000, Pilgrim reported that a welder performing routine maintenance work triggered a small fire. The fire was started by sparks showering from a welder’s torch that ignited radioactive waste contaminated rags in a room below. However, the public is told that fire safety at Pilgrim rests mainly upon the assumption that a fire will not spread from one room to another because the distance between the walls of each room is such to isolate any given fire – 17 feet. The 17-foot space was supposed to be empty. Did the welder’s sparks jump 17 feet?
Recent NRC Event Reports
NRC Event Report 37513 Unusual Event Declared due to Fire onsite.
NRC Event Report 35736: Unusual Event declared Due to request for Off-Site Fire Fighting Assistance to Extinguish Main Transformer Fire.
Fire Protection System at Pilgrim
Pilgrim’s fore protection system according to the NRC Resident Inspector, 2004, includes separation, automatic detection and suppression, and operator manual actions.
Pilgrim relies on “separation” for its primary means of fire defense. The 17 foot distance between the walls is supposed to be great enough to prevent flames from leaping from one room to another. However, when a former NRC Resident Inspector was asked a few years back how “separation” had been determined, it became apparent that they were relying on the original blue prints. There had not been actual inspections by the NRC so he guessed that the distance
between the walls was about “one giant step and two bunny hops."
The NRC Resident Inspector, 2004, was asked for an update. He stated that the licensee inspects the spaces and fire equipment in accordance with pre-established surveillance/test plans. Additionally, the NRC itself performs inspections, including reviews by the Resident Inspectors as part of the baseline program. In general, the resident reviews consider fire hazards and fire protection during routine (daily, weekly, etc) tours of plant areas. The question remains:
Can tours of the plant see what is between the walls?
More
Structural Issues
PilgrimWatch.org
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